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I. Introduction
In the two official government inquiries into the September 11,
2001, attacks, investigators issued reports sharply critical of the
nation's intelligence agencies The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as The 9/11
Commission, concluded that the attacks "revealed four kinds of
failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management., 2 A
joint panel of the Senate and House intelligence committees noted
that the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Pentagon's spy services "missed opportunities"
that would have "greatly enhanced" the chances of exposing Usama
bin Laden's terrorist conspiracy.3 Both reports found that the attacks
might have been thwarted if the spy agencies had done a better job of
sharing and publicizing some of the information they possessed about
the activities of known and suspected al Qaeda members.4 As a
Washington Post editorial observed, "[N]obody's eyes were seeing
enough of the picture to make sense of all the data."5
1. See The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT]. The 567-page 9/11 Commission report, released July 22, 2004, was prepared
over nineteen months by a ten-member nonpartisan panel headed by Thomas Keane,
former governor of New Jersey; Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities
Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the U.S. Sen.
Select Comm. on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, S.
REP. No. 107-351 (2002) & H.R. REP. No. 107-792 (2002) [hereinafter Senate and House
Select Comm. Report]. The nearly 900-page Senate and House joint report was prepared
over seven months by a panel of the Senate and House intelligence committees. The joint
panel report was completed December 2002, but it was classified at the time. The report
was declassified and released July 24, 2003. See David Johnston, Report of 9/11 Panel Cites
Lapses by C.I.A. and FBI., N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at Al, A13; Dana Priest, Susan
Schmidt & David Von Drehle, Hill's 9/11 Probe Finds Multiple Failure; White House, CIA
Kept Key Portions of Report Classified, WASH. POST., July 25, 2003, at Al, A16.
2. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 339. See also Philip Shenon, 9/11
Report Calls for a Sweeping Overhaul of Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at Al;
Dan Eggen, 9/11 Panel Chronicles US. Failures: Final Report Faults Two Administrations
and Calls for Broad Reforms, WASH. POST, July 23, 2004, at Al.
3. Senate and House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at xv.
4. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 353, 355-56, 400-03; Senate and
House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at xvii.
5. What Went Wrong, WASH. POST, July 25, 2003, at A24. The Senate and House
joint inquiry found that "[s]ome significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data
being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at
the time and therefore not disseminated... [T]he Intelligence Community failed to fully
capitalize on available, and potentially important, information." Senate and House Select
Comm. Report, supra note 1, at xi.
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In particular, The 9/11 Commission Report, released in July
2004, and the Senate and House joint panel report, released in July
2003, singled out the CIA for withholding certain information that led
to a string of operational failures and missteps before the attacks.6 In
examining the roles and responsibilities of the nation's respective
intelligence agencies, The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that
"[b]efore 9/11, the CIA was plainly the lead agency confronting al
Qaeda."7 Federal investigators found that, for nearly two years before
the attacks, the CIA had been aware of the terrorist ties of two 9/11
hijackers who were living in Southern California,8 and the Agency
had received reports of terrorist threats within the United States but
did not consider a public alert.9 The 9/11 Commission Report
revealed that the CIA had received a briefing paper entitled "Islamic
Extremist Learns to Fly" just weeks before the attacks.10 The briefing
told of the arrest of jihadist Zacarias Moussaoui, who was taken into
custody in Minnesota in mid-August 2001 after his behavior aroused
the suspicions of his flight school instructor who contacted local
authorities. The CIA did not investigate the information further."
In fact, as early as December 1998, four months after Usama bin
Laden ordered the bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa,
former CIA Director George J. Tenet issued a memo to several top
intelligence officials declaring a new phase in the conflict with bin
Laden.12 "We are at war," Tenet wrote. "I want no resources or
people spared in this effort."" The CIA shared some information with
senior government officials, but the imminent dangers perceived by
the Agency and its declaration of war were never made public.' 4 In
6. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 353.
7. Id. at 400.
8. See id. at 215-21; Senate and House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at 143-52.
See also Johnston, supra note 1, at A13.
9. See THE 9/11COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 353-58; Senate and House
Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at 118. See also Priest, supra note 1, at Al; David
Johnston, The Warnings Were There. But Who Was Listening? N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003,
at Al.
10. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 347.
11. Id.
12. CIA Director Tenet abruptly resigned June 3, 2004. See Elisabeth Bumiller and
Douglas Jehl, Tenet Resigns as CI.A. Director; 3 Harsh Reports Due, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2004, at Al, A12. Tenet officially left his post on July 11, 2004. At this writing, President
George W. Bush had nominated Florida Rep. Porter Goss to succeed Tenet. See Dana
Priest & Mike Allen, Bush Nominates Rep. Goss to Run CIA Democrats Question
Independence of Republican Veteran of Agency, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2004, at Al.
13. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 357.
14. Id.
other words, the CIA fought this "war" in secret and without the aid
of perhaps the nation's most powerful weapon-an alerted American
public, fully informed about the grave and immediate threat posed by
the bin Laden terror network.15
The Senate and House joint panel report concluded that the
CIA-led intelligence community had enough information before the
attacks to prompt a "heightened sense of alert" and take defensive
measures such as strengthening aviation security; placing suspected
terrorists here and abroad on watch lists; coordinating investigation
and law enforcement efforts with local and state authorities; and
alerting the American public to the seriousness and immediacy of the
potential threat.16
For the last two decades, near-blanket CIA secrecy has gone
largely unchecked, principally because of a sweeping 1985 U.S.
Supreme Court decision that exempted the Agency from virtually any
disclosure requirements under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).1" This exemption, established in Central Intelligence Agency
v. Sims,18 granted the Director of Central Intelligence broad and
unreviewable authority to protect intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure.' 9 Although there had been a line of
pre-Sims lower court decisions that upheld Agency decisions to refuse
certain FOIA requests, 2° the Sims decision has come to stand for the
Supreme Court's broadest and most forceful support of unchecked
CIA secrecy and nearly total judicial deference to Agency
21discretion.
15. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 103.
16. Senate and House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at xv, 118.
17. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
18 Id.
19. Id at 168-70.
20. See, e.g., Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting deference to
CIA discretion in the withholding of nonclassified historical research documents);
Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirmed summary judgment in favor
of the CIA in a FOIA Exemption 1 national security action on the basis of agency
affidavits as long as they simply contain "reasonable specificity" and are not called into
question by contradictory evidence or by evidence of Agency bad faith); Baker v. CIA,
580 F.2d 664, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (granting CIA discretion over withholding decisions);
Nat'l Comm'n On Law Enforcement and Soc. Justice v. CIA, 576 F.2d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir.
1978) (declining in camera review and holding that simply the submission of affidavits was
sufficient to grant summary judgment in favor of CIA); United States v. Marchetti, 466
F.2d 1309,1318 (4th Cir. 1972) ("What may seem trivial to the uninformed may appear of
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item
of information in its proper context").
21. See Arabian Shield Dev. CO. v. CIA, No. 3-98-CV-0624-BD, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2379, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1999), affd mer., 208 F. 3d 1007 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Indeed, the Sims ruling continues to resonate today because the
uncurbed secrecy it sanctions effectively blocks public and press
efforts to evaluate CIA performance, thus making accountability
difficult, if not impossible. For example, in 2004 the Supreme Court
let stand a federal appellate court decision that cited Sims repeatedly
in its rationale to allow the government to withhold basic information
on persons detained after the September 11 terrorist attacks.2 In
other recent rulings, courts followed Sims to reject FOIA requests
for:
" A 40-year-old CIA compilation of biographies of Cuban
leaders;23
" Unclassified records on CIA involvement in the award of an
oil-production agreement with the former Yemen Arab
Republic;
24
" Information sought by a doctoral student on the participation
of deceased British poets Stephen Spender and T.S. Eliot in a
CIA-funded cultural organization; 2 and
* The Clinton Administration's budget proposal for CIA
intelligence-related activities in 1999.26
The debate over the 9/11 tragedy continues. It is hard to argue
with absolute certainty that this nation's vast intelligence network
could have prevented the nineteen suicide terrorists from hijacking
four commercial airplanes and using them as missiles to attack New
York City and Washington, D.C., killing nearly 3,000 people and
setting the United States on a course of war in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But what is certain, as The 9/11 Commission concluded, is that
greater oversight and accountability of the nation's intelligence
processes are vital to help avert future terrorist assaults in America. 2
22. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Policy of Silence
on 9/11 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al.
23. Assassination Archives and Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 56 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
24. Arabian Shield Dev. Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2379, at *2.
25. Rubin v. CIA, 01 CIV. 2274 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19413, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,2001).
26. Fed'n of Am. Scientists v. CIA, Civ. No. 98-2107 (TFH), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18135 (D.D.C. Nov. 12,1999).
27. Throughout The 9/1.1 Commission Report, there are numerous references to the
crucial importance of the accountability and oversight of intelligence operations:("Congress needs dramatic change... to strengthen oversight and focus accountability,"
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at xvi); ("The investigations spotlighted the
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Revisiting the merits of the Supreme Court-crafted CIA
exemption to the FOIA is a good place to start. The CIA's missteps
and failures in connection with the 2001 terrorist attacks illustrate the
follies of how excessive secrecy can not only cloak the Agency's
activities but can also conceal grave problems in Agency
management. Although several commentaries on CIA v. Sims were
published around the time of the decision, the consequences of the
ruling have been largely overlooked in law review literature since
then." The purpose of this article, therefore, is to take a fresh look at
how the Supreme Court freed the CIA from virtually any
accountability and disclosure obligations under the FOIA, and also to
examine the subsequent impact of unchecked Agency secrecy over
the years. In particular, this article seeks to shed light on the question
of whether the Sims Court ruling comported with the plain meaning
and legislative history of the FOIA . In Part II, this article examines
the FOIA and also discusses the National Security Act of 1947, 0 the
statute on which the Sims Court relied to exempt the CIA from the
FOIA. Part III analyzes the Court's majority opinion in CIA v. Sims,
along with a concurring opinion that sharply disagreed with the
majority's reasoning. In Part IV, this article reviews the line of cases
to date that have cited Sims as precedent to deny a wide variety of
FOIA requests.31 Part V argues that the Sims rationale for blanket
importance of accountability," id. at 99); ("[T]he oversight function of Congress has
diminished over time.... The unglamorous but essential work of [intelligence operations]
oversight has been neglected, and few members (of Congress) past or present believe it is
performed well," id. at 105); ("Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional
oversight may be among the most difficult and important," id. at 419); ("Congressional
oversight for intelligence--and counterterrorism--is now dysfunctional," id. at 420).
28 See Brent Filbert, Freedom of Information Act: CIA v. Sims, The CIA Is Given
Broad Powers to Withhold the Identities of Intelligence Sources, 54 UMKC L. REV. 332
(1986); Jeffrey R. Godley, Administrative Law-Defining the CIA's 'Intelligence Sources'
as an Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act--CIA v. Sims, 471 US. 159 (1985), 9
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 333 (1987); James A. Goldston, Jennifer M. Granholm, & Robert
J. Robinson, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409 (1986); Mark Jordan, Comment, [CIA v. Sims, 105 S. Ct. 1881
(1985)] Freedom of Information Act: CIA's Right to Nondisclosure Broadened by Liberal
Definition of Intelligence Source, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 586 (1986); Amy E. Rees, Recent
Developments Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: "Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both," 44 DUKE L.J. 1183 (1995); Michael H. Hughes, Note, CIA v.
Sims; Supreme Court Deference to Agency Interpretation of FOIA Exemption 3, 35 CATH.
U. L. REv. 279 (1985).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
30. Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3), 61 Stat. 495, 498 (1947) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
403(d)(3)(2000)).
31. Assassination Archives, 334 F.3d 55 (2003); Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d
918; Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 1996); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
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CIA secrecy has been long outmoded by watershed historic events
such as the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal and the end of the
Cold War, which, in the aggregate, have prompted a profound shift in
political culture in terms of what the American public has come to
expect to know about their government and demand in transparency.
Finally, Part V proposes a legislative model that would establish
guidelines for CIA information disclosure requirements under the
FOIA.
H. Transparency or Secrecy
Government secrecy in the interests of American national
security is an inherent key to effective intelligence operations, with a
history as old as the nation itself.32 However, the government's need
for confidentiality and secrecy in foreign relations and national
defense often conflicts with the democratic principles of an open
society and the First Amendment rights of citizens to debate
important national policy issues.33 As one commentator observed:
"Citizens can scarcely influence decisions they know nothing about.
Where secrecy reigns, government officials are in a position to rule at
virtually their own discretion."34 Further, when government shields
official actions from public knowledge and review, it becomes easier
for governmental incompetence, corruption and abuse of power to go
undetected.
CIA v. Sims illustrates this conflict between the democratic
values of government transparency and the practical needs for
1993); Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993); Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.
1992); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F. 2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th
Cir. 1989); Rubin, 2001 U.S. Dist., LEXIS 19413; Arabian Shield Dev. Co., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2379; Federation, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135; U.S. Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620
F.Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1985).
32. See Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home:
Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 349-350
(1986).
For example, in the first twenty-nine essays of THE FEDERALIST, the main claim
for union laid out by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay focused on the
risks of foreign war and influence. See id. A decade earlier, George Washington wrote to
one of his secret agents during the War of Independence: "The necessity of procuring
good intelligence, is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to
add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success
depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are generally defeated."
Sims, 471 U.S. at 172 n.16, citing John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 8 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON
479 (1933) (letter from George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton, July 26, 1777).
33. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 32, at 352-53.
34. FRANCIS E. ROURKE, The United States, in GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN
DEMOCRACIES 119 (Itzhak Galnoor ed., New York University Press 1977).
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government secrecy.35 In arriving at its conclusions in Sims, the Court
needed to resolve the conflict between the opposing policy objectives
clearly laid out in the Freedom of Information Act36 and National
Security Act.37 This section discusses the legislative histories of these
two statutes.
A. A Philosophy of Full Disclosure-The Freedom of Information Act
Congress passed the FOIA in 1966 and has amended it in
significant ways over the decades. 8 The FOIA applies to records held
by the myriad federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. It also applies to the cabinet offices, such as
the departments of State, Defense and Commerce, and includes sub-
departments such as the FBI, which is under the aegis of the
Department of Justice. 9 The statute makes these records available to
"any person" upon request, and places the burden of refusing
disclosure on the government; a FOIA requester is not required to
justify why a record should be disclosed. 4° The FOIA does not apply
to records held by state or local governments, Congress, the courts,
municipal corporations, private individuals, private companies, or
private entities holding federal contracts. 4 Nor does it apply to the
personal staff of the President and some executive-branch agencies
whose sole function is to advise the President, such as the Council of
Economic Advisors.42
To further inform the public about governmental activities and
agency operations, the statute requires that federal agencies make
available in public reading rooms and also publish-both in the
Federal Register and on the Internet-their organizational plans and
regulations.43 The reason for this requirement is to guard against the
35. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., concurring).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
37. 50 U.S.C. § 403(3) (formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. § 404(d)(3)).
38. The FOIA was amended in several important respects in 1974, 1976, 1986, and
1996. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976);
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); and Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996).
39. U.S. Department of Justice, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE &
PRIVACY AcT OVERVIEW 28, MAY 2002 [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE].
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2000). See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
41. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 39, at 29-31.
42. Id.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3),(4)(A) (2000). The Internet publication requirement was a
provision in the Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 (EFOIA), Pub. L. No.
104-231, §§ 1-12, 110 Stat. 3048-3054(1996)(amending sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
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development of secret law, such as an obscure order or opinion,
known only to agency officials but not to the general public who use
the FOIA.44 The statute creates a judicially enforceable policy that
favors a "general philosophy of full agency disclosure" 45 based on the
principle that the "public as a whole has a right to know what its
government is doing." 46 As the Supreme Court observed: "The basic
purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed. 47
Until the FOIA was signed into law, the public and press had no
legal recourse when they were denied access to government-held
information.48 The FOIA replaced Section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) of 1946.49 APA Section 3 ostensibly was a
public information provision to allow the public to gain access to
"matters of official record" held by the federal government.:
However, the law contained vague language and loopholes that
federal agencies routinely exploited to block public access to their
records, and the law came to be widely regarded as an "excuse for
secrecy" and more of a withholding statute than a disclosure statute."
One of the greatest roadblocks to disclosure in APA Section 3 was a
provision that record requesters had to establish that the information
they sought pertained specifically to them. 2 This restriction prevented
44. See N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1975).; H.R. REP.
No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966). See also FOIA GUIDE, supra note 39, at 20.
45. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965). The Court has consistently recognized this
principle. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U. S. 487, 494 (1994); Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220 (1978); U.S. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352, 360-361 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
46. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 5.
47. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 242.
48. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966). See generally HAROLD L. CROSS, THE
PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (Columbia University Press 1953) & James Russell Wiggins,
FREEDOM OR SECRECY (Oxford University Press 1964).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
50. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3.
51. A 1965 Senate report on the proposed FOIA legislation described the APA as
"full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the public.
Innumerable times it appears that information is withheld only to cover up embarrassing
mistakes or irregularities." Id See also CROSS, supra note 48, at 223-28 (1953). Cross, a
Columbia University law professor, an attorney for the New York Times and a leader in
the movement to enact the FOIA, wrote that the governmental "cult of secrecy" that
developed after the Second World War rested in great part on the "tortured
interpretation" of APA Section 3. Id at 246.
52. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 5.
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third parties, such as journalists, attorneys, businesses, public interest
groups, historians and others from gaining access to government
records. As a result of these flaws, Congress embarked on a series of
hearings in 1955 to initiate open-government reform and create a
judicially enforceable statutory right of public access to government
records.53 A decade and 173 hearings later, Congress passed the
Freedom of Information Act of 1 96 624
Over the years, the FOIA has proved to be a useful tool for
informing the nation about important issues of public interest and for
filling gaps in history with previously overlooked or concealed
information." When Congress passed the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act in 1996,56 House sponsors of the legislation noted
that the FOIA has "led to the disclosure of waste, fraud, abuse, and
wrongdoing" in the federal government, and the "identification of
unsafe consumer products, harmful drugs, and serious health
hazards.57 The Philadelphia Inquirer used the FOIA in 2003 to learn
that federal citations for pollution law violations plummeted during
the early years of the George W. Bush administration, dropping 35
percent in 2002-2003 from the year before. Also in 2003, the Dayton
Daily News used records acquired under the FOIA to report on the
risks of violence, accidents, disease and suicide faced abroad by Peace
Corps volunteers. 9 And in an award-winning 2002 investigative series,
53. See Martin E. Halstuk, Blurred Vision: How Supreme Court FOIA Opinions on
Invasion of Privacy Have Missed the Target of Legislative Intent, 4 COMM. L. & POL'Y 111,
116 (1999). From 1955 until 1960, Rep. John Moss presided over 173 hearings, which
published 17 volumes of transcripts and 14 volumes of reports. See JOHN T. O'REILLY,
FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, at 6-9 (West Group, 3d ed. 2000). (O'Reilly's
book, Federal Information Disclosure, is the leading legal practice guide on The Freedom
of Information Act and the Privacy Act.) A series of proposed reform legislation and
more hearings followed in 1963, and continued until the Freedom of Information Act was
signed into law in 1966. See id. at 11-15.
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at Sec. 2(a)(3)&(4) (1996).
56. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, §§
1-12, 110 Stat. 3048-3054 (1996) (amending sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)).
57. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at Sec. 2 (a)(3)&( 4). For instance, investigations by
journalists using the FOIA have exposed FBI harassment of Dr. Martin Luther King,
safety hazards at nuclear power plants, unsanitary conditions at food processing plants, the
presence of harmful wastes in drinking water and the increased incidence of cancer among
plutonium workers. See KENT R. MIDDLETON, WILLIAM E. LEE AND BILL F.
CHAMBERLIN, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 482(2003).
58. Seth Borenstein, Pollution citations plummet under Bush, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec.
9, 2003, at Al.
59. REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOW TO USE THE
FEDERAL FOI ACT 2, 9th ed., (2004). Previously, the Dayton Daily News used
government documents obtained under the FOIA to report how the government largely
2004]
using documents obtained under the FOIA, the San Francisco
Chronicle revealed that during the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI covertly
campaigned to fire University of California President Clark Kerr and
conspired with the CIA director to pressure the California Board of
Regents to force out liberal professors. 6 Historians also use the FOIA
to flesh out or set right the historical record. For example, a 2001
FOIA request by the National Security Archive disclosed for the first
time that President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger had personally assured Indonesian leader Suharto that the
United States would not oppose an Indonesian takeover of East
Timor.6' For a quarter-century, Ford and Kissinger had denied they
knew of Indonesia's military plans.62 The FOIA is also a valuable
instrument of inquiry for the general public, as evidenced by the May
2004 disclosure that an Army sergeant who was captured along with
fellow soldier Jessica Lynch, in the same March 2003 ambush during
the war in Iraq, was later executed by Iraqi soldiers.63 Sgt. Donald
Walters originally had been listed as killed in action, but after his
mother sought the details of his death through a FOIA request, the
government revealed the true circumstances, and his killing was
subsequently investigated as a war crime'f
The FOIA's crafters understood that citizens in a democracy
must have access to government information in order to make
informed decisions.6 Lawmakers also acknowledged, however, that
instances arise when secrecy is necessary for government to function
effectively and to protect the privacy of individuals and businesses.66
ignored sexual assault charges brought by women in the military against enlisted men and
officers. Id.
60. Seth Rosenfeld, Winning series uncovers FBI secrets using the FOIA, THE
BRECHNER REPORT, Dec. 2003, at 4. See also www.sfgate.com/campus (last visited Jan.
13, 2004).
61. The 1975 East Timor invasion left more than 100,000 dead in a brutal occupation
that did not end until 1999 when international peacekeepers were sent in. See The
National Security Archive, East Timor Revisited (Dec. 6, 2001), at http:
//www.gwu.edu/-NationalSecurityActrchiv/NATIONALSECURITY
ACT'EBB/NATIONAL SECURITY ACTEBB62/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
62. The Ford Administration wanted to shore up ties with Indonesia, a
noncommunist country that produced oil and controlled key sea lanes in Southeast Asia.
Id.
63. Associated Press, The Casualties: New Account of '03 Ambush Changes Way a
Soldier Died, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2004, at A8.
64. Id.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 2-3, 5-6 (1966).
66. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965) ("At the same time that a broad philosophy of
'freedom of information' is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally
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Congress, therefore, created nine statutory exemptions that cover
certain categories of information that agencies may-but are not
required to-withhold. 67 Congress emphasized that the exemptions
were limited, and outside of these enumerated categories, "all citizens
have a right to know." As a 1965 Senate report noted, the FOIA
thus provides a "workable formula which encompasses, balances, and
protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible
disclosure." 69
The FOIA's legislative history shows that Congress was guided
by a philosophy that directly linked a policy of full agency disclosure
to bedrock democratic principles.7°  The Senate report that
accompanied the FOIA legislation observed that the "great
importance of having an information policy of full disclosure"
becomes apparent when one considers the hundreds of myriad
agencies and departments of the executive branch.71 In a series of
majority opinions, the Supreme Court has consistently cited this 1965
Senate report as the primary indicator of the FOIA's legislative
72
purpose.
important rights of privacy... certain material, such as the investigatory files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.").
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1-9). The FOIA does not apply to matters that fall under the
categories of (1) classified information and national security; (2) internal agency personnel
information; (3) information exempted by statutes; (4) trade secrets and other confidential
business information; (5) agency memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade personal privacy;
(7) law enforcement investigation records; (8) reports from regulated financial institutions;
and (9) geological and geophysical information.
68. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 6.
69. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3.
70. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3. and H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497 (1966). See also NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220 (1978); Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
71. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3.
72. Justice Byron White wrote: "Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It
seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view
and attempts to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands." Mink, 410
U.S. at 80, citing S. REP. No. 89-813. Justice William J. Brennan wrote in 1976 that the
FOIA's legislative history makes it "crystal clear the congressional objective" for the Act
was to "pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny." Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)(quoting Rose v.
Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d. 261, 263 (1974)). Brennan said the FOIA's "basic
purpose reflected 'a general philosophy of full agency disclosure' unless information falls
under one of the nine exemptions. Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-61 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at
3 ). He stressed, however, that these exemptions are limited, and "do not obscure the basic
policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the act." Rose, 425 U.S. at
361 (quoting Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d. at 263 ).
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Although the FOIA received overwhelming congressional
support,73 passing the House unanimously, enforcement of the law
became difficult. Senate and House reports on the FOIA repeatedly
emphasized that the statute directs federal agencies to provide as
much disclosure as possible,74 but many agencies resisted compliance,
typically interpreting the exemptions broadly to justify withholding
documents.75 Consequently, Congress clarified and strengthened the
FOIA in 1974 through several amendments, which were prompted in
great part by the Watergate scandal during the Richard M. Nixon
administration.76
One of the major changes was a substantial revision of
Exemption 1, the national security exemption."' This analysis turns
next to an examination of Exemption 1, which surfaced as a
contentious issue in CIA v. Sims.78 The legislative history of the 1974
amendments shows that Congress revised Exemption 1 explicitly to
reiterate its intent to grant public access to agency records whenever
possible-even when national security issues are raised.79
73. The bill passed the House with a vote of 307-0. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497(1966).
74. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 89-1497; S. REP. No. 89-813.
75. ALLAN ROBERT ADLER, ED., LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN
GOVERNMENT LAWS 8 (1997). Agency officials also used various ploys to discourage
FOIA use, such as high fees for copying documents, long delays, and claims that they
could not find the documents requested.
76. During the hearings on the proposed 1974 amendments, for example, Sen. Ted
Kennedy referred to the Watergate Hearings, which were taking place at the same time:
If yesterday's testimony [by Nixon's Attorney General Elliot Richardson]
teaches us anything, it demonstrates beyond debate that government secrecy
breeds government deceit. High government officials sat around in the Attorney
General's office calmly discussing the commission of bugging and mugging and
kidnapping and blackmail.... Federal officials who want their activities to
remain hidden from public view are going to have to tell us why, and their
reasons are going to have to be very convincing and very specific.
Executive Privilege, 2 Hearings Before a Subcomm of the Sen. Judiciary Comm and a
Subconim of the Sen. Comm on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 209-10 (1973). See
also O'REILLY, supra note 53, at 45. President Ford, who took office after Nixon resigned
on August 8, 1974, vetoed the 1974 amendments, but Congress overrode the veto, with the
House voting 371-31 and the Senate voting 65-27 on Nov. 20 and 21, 1974, respectively.
See O'REILLY, supra note 53, at 48.
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(B)(1) (2000).
7& See Sims, 471 U.S. at 188-90 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Exemption 1 issue in
Sims will be discussed in detail later in this article.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News 6290. See Pub. L. No. 93-502, 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561,
(1974).
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1. The FOIA and National Security
Exemption 1, the national security exemption, is the only FOIA
exemption that allows the executive branch, rather than Congress, to
determine the criteria for disclosing information." Exemption 1 states
that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are both "specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and
are in fact.., properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order."81
The 1966 version of Exemption 1 said only that the FOIA did not
apply to matters "specifically required by Executive Order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy."' The
difference in language between the two versions, as indicated by the
italicized text above, reflects Congress' intent to provide for judicial
review of purportedly classified documents to ensure that (1) the
material actually falls under the specifically enumerated categories of
information that can be classified under Executive Order, and that (2)
the document was properly classified according to prescribed
procedures.83
This 1974 check on mere assertions by the government that
withheld information was classified came as a swift and direct
congressional response to a 1973 Supreme Court decision that
restricted access to records on national security grounds.
84
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink concerned a request by
Rep. Patsy Mink, who asked the government to release an
interdepartmental report on a scheduled underground nuclear test off
the Alaskan coast.8 Mink wanted environmental impact statements
contained in the report. The government refused to disclose the
impact statements, contending that the report was classified "top
secret" and, therefore, any material contained in the report was
exempt from disclosure under Exemption 1. 6 Mink sued in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia to obtain the information
under the FOIA, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (emphasis added).
82. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1966).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290. See Pub. L. No. 93-502, 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561, (1974).
84. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
85. Id. at 75.
86. Id. The government also cited Exemption 5 to defend its withholding decision.
Under Exemption 5, the FOIA does not apply to inter- or intra-departmental memos or
reports. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
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the government. 7 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision, ruling that
the national security exemption allowed the executive branch to
withhold only the portions of the requested documents that were
classified, not the entire record. 8' The court of appeals directed the
lower court to conduct an in camera review of the files to determine
whether the specific information requested was not classified and
could be released. 89
The government appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed
the D.C. Circuit's ruling in a decisive 7-to-1 vote, holding that
classified documents were exempt from judicial review.90 In arriving at
its decision, the Mink Court deferred to the government's argument
that the mere assertion of classification was sufficient to justify
withholding the documents from the public.9' The Court held that
Congress had not intended to give courts the right to review
documents that the government said were exempt on grounds of
national security. The Court concluded that the government was
required to only declare that the document (1) was classified and (2)
its subject matter fell within the categories of information protected
from disclosure by Executive Order.92 The Court held that the
government could meet its Exemption 1 burden simply by offering an
affidavit that declared that the requested information was classified. 93
Justice Byron R. White, who wrote the opinion, said Exemption
l's plain text was ambiguous and, in his view, it provided no oversight
process to review whether proper procedure was used to classify a
document: "Congress could certainly have provided that the
Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established
its own procedures.... But Exemption 1 does neither."'9 The Court
held that the national security exemption neither permitted nor
compelled in camera inspection by judges to sort out documents that
were not classified. 95
87. Mink, 410 U.S. at 78.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 84.
91. Id. at 83-84.
92- Id. at 84.
93. Mink, 410 U.S. at 84-85.
94. Id. at 83.
95. Id. at 81.
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Responding to the Mink Court's ruling, Congress said the Court
had contravened the FOIA's legislative intent,96 and lawmakers
revised Exemption 1 to override the Mink decision.9 In the 1974
FOIA amendments, Congress modified the national security
exemption to give courts the power of de novo judicial review,
including in camera inspection of documents, to look beyond the
mere fact that material had been classified and to consider whether
classification was proper.98 Congress established that the Executive
Order on Classified National Security Information must set out both
substantive and procedural criteria for withholding national security
information.99 Substantive criteria spell out what categories of
information may be considered for classification, and procedural
criteria identify the proper process for classifying national security
information.'O'
Even under Exemption l's revised language, it should be noted
that judicial oversight is strictly limited. A judge cannot challenge the
classification standards adopted by a president; a judge can only
determine whether the information was classified according to its
content and proper procedure as set forth in an Executive Order. '0'
96. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290.
97. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)
(2000).
9& Id.
99. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1200 (1973-74).
100. For example, some of the categories mentioned in the current executive order
include military plans, programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities, foreign
relations activities and intelligence activities. See Exec. Order 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315
(Mar. 28, 2003) (George W. Bush Admin.). Regarding process, only specifically
designated officials may classify information, and classified information must be marked to
show the identity of the classification authority, the classification level and classification
instructions. Id
101. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Presidential classification standards vary from
administration to administration. See e.g. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315
(Mar. 28, 2003) (George W. Bush Admin.); Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825
(Apr. 20, 1995) (William J. Clinton Admin.); Exec. Order No. 12,356. 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982)
(Ronald Reagan-George H.W. Bush Admin.); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190
(1978) (Jimmy Carter Admin.). For example, the Clinton Administration's 1995 executive
order favored more disclosure than the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations,
though less than Carter's. By comparison, President George W. Bush's 2003 executive
order closely followed Clinton's.
A review of Presidential standards for classification over the past twenty-five
years reveals varying philosophical differences between Republican and Democratic
administrations when it comes to government transparency. President Carter, for example,
tended to support a presumption for disclosure. In June 1978, he issued an executive order
that favored declassification if the public interest in disclosure outweighed damage to
national security that "might be reasonably expected" to result from disclosure." Exec.
Once information is determined to be properly classified under the
Executive Order's guidelines, it is exempt from the FOIA. Besides
providing for judicial review in an Exemption 1 FOIA dispute, the
1974 amendments further enhanced public access by requiring
agencies to segregate and release nonexempt information from a
record that contains exempt information.10' Congress made a point of
Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978). In addition, Carter ordered that all classified
documents and materials were to be automatically declassified after six years. President
Reagan departed sharply from President Carter's stance on classification and issued an
executive order in 1982 that enlarged classification authority. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3
C.F.R. 166 (1982). Reagan created new classification categories, and under his
administration's policy, it was presumed that in cases of reasonable doubt, information
should be classified. See id. In addition, agencies classifying information were not required,
as they had been under President Carter, to balance the need for security against the
public's interest in disclosure. Finally, the Reagan Administration standard for deciding
the "confidential" classification was relaxed from Carter's "identifiable damage to
national security" to a reasonable expectation that damage would take place. Exec. Order
No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982). The George H. W. Bush Administration later followed
this policy favoring classification.
The 1995 Clinton Executive Order on classification was the first issued since 1982,
and addressed complaints that extensive overclassification of records was crippling the
ability of the press, scholars, researchers and federal agencies to understand important
national security matters. See Rebecca Daugherty, President Bush Broadens Classification
Rules, THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Spring 2003, at 16. Clinton's classification rules
required agencies to provide more detail describing the potential damage to national
security in order to withhold records. To decide declassification, Clinton Executive Order
12,958 directs agencies to apply a balancing test to determine "whether the public interest
in disclosure outweighs the damage to national security that might reasonably be expected
from disclosure." Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995).
President George W. Bush signed Executive Order No. 13,292, which keeps in
place, but amends Clinton Executive Order 12,958. While the Carter, Reagan-Bush and
Clinton administrations issued new executive orders, replacing previous orders, the
George W. Bush Administration did not, keeping Clinton's Executive Order No. 12,958
largely in effect. See Exec. Order 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003) (George W.
Bush Admin.); Exec. Order 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995) (William J.
Clinton Admin.). Bush's amendments to Clinton's Executive Order made relatively few
changes that will affect FOIA Exemption 1. One key change removes language ordering
that information be declassified if there is "significant doubt" that disclosure could harm
national security. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003).
Rebecca Daugherty of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press noted that the
Clinton order, at least on paper, had reversed a long-standing unwritten policy of "if in
doubt, don't give it out" that had resulted in unwieldy stores of classified information. See
Daugherty, President Bush Broadens Classification Rules, at 16. In regard to classification,
the Bush Executive Order makes it easier for the government to keep documents
classified because the order delays by three years the release of declassified records dating
from 1978 or earlier. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003). This
provision amends Clinton's Executive Order, which eased the declassification process. The
Bush Executive Order also, for the first time, gives the vice president the authority to
classify information. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). See also FOIA GUIDE supra note 39, at 122-23.
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emphasizing that this segregation-and-disclosure requirement applied
to Exemption ."°
2. Congress Reins In Agency Discretion
Congress significantly revised the FOIA again in 1976. This time,
lawmakers amended Exemption 3'04 for the purpose of reining in
agency discretion to withhold information.' ° One of the central issues
in CIA v. Sims concerned the CIA's use of Exemption 3 to refuse a
FOIA request.106 Under FOIA Exemption 3, agencies can refuse a
FOIA request for information if that information is shielded from
disclosure under any other federal statutes. 1°7 Exemption 3's
legislative history shows that-like Exemption 1-it was amended by
Congress explicitly to enhance the FOIA's general philosophy of full
disclosure and provide a check on executive branch authority to
withhold information. 1°8
In its original 1966 language, Exemption 3 simply said the FOIA
did not apply to matters "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute."' 9 This language was amended in 1976 with the addition of a
two-part test that allows an agency to cite a statute as a withholding
authority, provided that the statute's plain text meaning (1) allows no
discretion on the part of the agency, and (2) establishes specific
criteria for withholding or makes clear exactly what kinds of materials
can be withheld. " °
Like the 1974 revision to Exemption 1, the 1976 amendment to
Exemption 3 also came in the aftermath of a Supreme Court FOIA
decision to which Congress objected. In Administrator, FAA v.
Robertson in 1975,"' the issue before the Court concerned whether a
Federal Aviation Administration decision to withhold documents was
authorized under the secrecy provisions of the Federal Aviation Act
103. The D.C. Circuit explicitly emphasized that the 1974 segregation-and-disclosure
rule also applies to records withheld under Exemption 1. See Oglesby v. United States
Dep't of the Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Krikorian v. Dep't of State, 984
F.2d 461,466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000).
105. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt.1, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204-05.
See also Sims v. CIA (Sims ), 642 F.2d 562, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
106. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000). See FOIA GUIDE, supra note 39, at 154.
108. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt.1, at 23, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204-05. See also
Sims 1, 642 F.2d at 567.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1966).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000).
111. FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
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of 1958.'12 This suit was initiated after the FAA rejected a consumer
group's request to release agency reports on the operations and
maintenance performance of commercial aircraft. The FAA withheld
the information, asserting that Section 1104 of the FAA Act of 1958113
qualified as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. This section
allowed the administrator to withhold data when, in the
administrator's judgment, disclosure would adversely affect the
agency and is not required in the public interest.114
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled
against the government, holding that Section 1104 of the Federal
Aviation Act did not qualify as an exempting statute under
Exemption 3115 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
reasoning that the discretionary nature of Section 1104 and its vague
public interest standard were insufficient for it to qualify as a specific
exempting statute under the meaning of Exemption 3 .6 On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court ruling.'
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, held
that the appeals court misinterpreted Exemption 3. The Court upheld
the FAA Administrator's broad discretion to withhold records on the
grounds that a statute need not precisely identify specific categories
of data that may be withheld in order to qualify as a withholding
statute under Exemption 3."8 Justices William 0. Douglas and
William J. Brennan dissented, supporting the lower courts' view that
Section 1104's discretionary nature and vague public interest standard
gave the agency more discretion than permissible under the FOIA."9
Congress nullified the Robertson decision in the 1976 FOIA
amendments by revising Exemption 3 specifically to limit an agency
executive's discretion to withhold information.' 2° Echoing the
dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, legislators said the Court's
broad construction of Exemption 3 gave too much discretion to
agency officials and conflicted with FOIA policy. 2 ' Congress declared
that the Supreme Court interpreted Exemption 3 in a way that
112. Id. at 265-67, citing 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1982).
113. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1982).
114. Robertson, 422 U.S. at 259.
115. Robertson v. Butterfield, No. 71-1970 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 31, 1972).
116. Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031,1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
117. Robertson, 422 U.S. at 263.
118. Id. at 266-67.
119. Id. at 268 (Douglas, J., & Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, pt.1, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204-05.
121. Id.
granted the FAA Administrator "carte blanche to withhold any
information he pleases.""'
The legislative histories of Exemptions 1 and 3 thus show that
Congress clearly reiterated its FOIA mandate for a broad policy of
full disclosure in 1974 and 1976, going so far as to admonish the
Supreme Court by nullifying two rulings that conflicted with
Congress' intent.'25 This policy stands in sharp relief against the
objectives of the National Security Act of 1947,'24 which was the
statutory basis cited by the CIA to justify withholding in CIA v.
Sims.
25
B. The National Security Act of 1947
Passed by Congress after the Second World War, the National
Security Act mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy
and military establishments of the federal government. 26 The law was
enacted in the wake of harsh congressional criticism over the deficient
performance of U.S. intelligence operations before the attack on
Pearl Harbor and during the ensuing war.'2 7 A 1947 Senate report that
accompanied the legislation for the National Security Act said the
U.S. war effort "disclosed certain fundamental weaknesses in our
security structure which should be remedied while their details are
fresh in mind."' ' The report pointed to this nation's "slow and costly
mobilization" and "limited intelligence of the designs and capacities
of our enemies" as convincing evidence that the United States "would
be imperiled were we to ignore the costly lessons of the war and fail
to... prevent the recurrence of these defects."' 29
The National Security Act created the National Security Council
and the CIA in order to improve the nation's ability to collect and
evaluate intelligence information not only during war but also during
peacetime7 ° The CIA grew out of the World War II Office of
Strategic Services and formerly was known as the Central Intelligence
Group, which was one of a number of small decentralized postwar
122 Id.
123. See Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
124. 50 U.S.C. § 403(3),formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. § 404(d)(3).
125. 471 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1985).
126. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2-3 (1947). See also H.R REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3 (1947).
127. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2-3. See also H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3.
128. S. REP. No. 80-239, at 2.
129. Id.
130. See H.R. REP. No. 80-961, at 2-3 (1947).
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intelligence groups.131 The National Security Act authorized the CIA
to be the single organization for gathering and analyzing intelligence
related to national defense. In hearings on the National Security Act,
General Hoyt Vandenberg, former director of the Central
Intelligence Group, testified that reorganization of all intelligence
operations under the broad and centralized authority of the CIA was
necessary for maximum intelligence effectiveness."' "It is almost
universally agreed that the collection of clandestine intelligence must
be centralized someplace, because if it is disseminated among several
organizations without one head, the agents who are operating expose
each other."'33
A key provision in the National Security Act, which emerged as
the overarching issue in CIA v. Sims, grants the Director of Central
Intelligence the authority to protect "intelligence sources and
methods" from unauthorized disclosure.TM Neither the National
Security Act's plain meaning nor its legislative history defined
"intelligence sources" or provided clarifying language for this term."3 5
Still, the statute reflects clear congressional intent that the law was
meant to enable the CIA to gather intelligence from a wide variety of
sources.' For example, Allen W. Dulles, who helped found the
Agency and served as its director from 1953 to 1961, testified during
congressional hearings on the National Security Act that intelligence
sources are widely diverse. 37 "We cannot get our intelligence solely
from our diplomatic people and our military and naval attaches or
from the agents that a Central Agency should send out," Dulles
131. Id. In addition, the National Security Act also merged the War Department and
Navy Department into a single Department of Defense under the Secretary of Defense,
who also directed the newly created Department of the Air Force. S. REP. No. 80-239, at
3-4 (1947). See also The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
132. Hearing Before the Comm on Expenditures in the Exec. Dep'ts on HR 2319(National Security Act of 1947), 80th Cong., 5-6 (1947) (testimony of General Hoyt
Vandenberg).
133. Id.
134. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167-68, citing 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3).
135. 50 U.S.C. § 403(3), formerly codified at 50 U.S.C. § 404(d)(3). The absence of a
definition for "intelligence sources" in Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act
presented the thorniest problem in the eight-year-long Sims court fight. This issue will be
discussed in detail later in the article.
136. Sims, 471 U.S. at 170-72.
137. Hearing Before the Comm on Expenditures in the Exec. Dep'ts on H.R. 2319(National Security Act of 1947), 80th Cong., 22 (July 27, 1947) (testimony of Allen Dulles).
See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 171.
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said.'-' He dispelled the notion of the classic "secret agent" as
depicted in films and novels, saying, "American businessmen and
American professors and Americans of all types and descriptions who
travel around the world are one of the greatest repositories of
intelligence that we have." 39 His remarks were echoed by Rep. James
W. Wadsworth, who said the function of the CIA is "to constitute
itself as a gathering point for information coming from all over the
world through all kinds of channels," ' 4° and Rep. Hale Boggs, who
testified that the CIA gathers and analyzes information, "from
wherever we can get it.,,141
In addition to citing the National Security Act of 1947 in its CIA
v. Sims analysis, the Supreme Court also turned to an amendment to
the act, the Central Intelligence Agency Information Act of 
1984.142
This amendment exempted specifically defined CIA "operational
files" from disclosure, but left remaining files subject to the FOIA.
143
According to the House report accompanying the legislation,
operational files consist of:
records which, after line-by-line security review, almost invariably
prove not to be releasable under the FOIA.... A decade of
experience has shown that certain specifically identifiable CIA
operational records systems, containing the most sensitive
information directly concerning intelligence sources and methods,
138. Hearing Before the Comm on Expenditures in the Exec. Dep'ts on HR. 2319
(National Security Act of 1947), 80th Cong., 22 (July 27, 1947) (testimony of Allen Dulles).
See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 171.
139. Hearing Before the Comm on Expenditures in the Exec. Dep'ts on HR 2319
(National Security Act of 1947), 80th Cong., 22 (July 27, 1947) (testimony of Allen Dulles).
See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 171.
140. Sims, 471 U.S. at 171 n. 14.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 168 n. 11, 174 n. 19, 193, citing Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209-2212 (1984).
143. CIA Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984), codified at 50
U.S.C. § 431. See also H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4 (1984) (House Permanent Select Comm.
on Intelligence), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742. The CIA Information Act defines
"operational files" as:
(1) files of the Directorate of Operations which document the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence operations or intelligence or security liaison
arrangements of information exchanges with foreign governments or their
intelligence or security services: (2) files of the Directorate for Science and
Technology which document the means by which foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence is collected through scientific and technical systems; and (3)
Personnel files of the Office of Security which document investigations
conducted to determine the suitability of potential foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence sources.
Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 431.
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inevitably contain few, if any, items which can be disclosed to
FOIA requesters."
Some examples of non-disclosable information contained in
operational files include details about organizational structure,
numbers of personnel assigned to certain functions, and personnel
names, titles and salaries.1 45
The House report declared that these files were exempted in
order to relieve the CIA from the time-consuming bureaucratic
requirements for complying with certain FOIA requests that typically
are rejected anyway, and to help reduce troublesome backlogs.' 46 The
legislative history of the CIA Information Act shows that the
legislation was enacted principally because of years of prodding by
the Agency, which wanted Congress to provide additional assurance
that CIA sources will remain confidential.'47 In 1979, for example,
CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci declared that the "total
application of public disclosure statutes like the FOIA to the CIA is
seriously damaging our ability to do our job."'" The amendment's
sponsors said the CIA's ability to serve the national interest depends
on "the confidence of intelligence sources that their relationships with
the CIA will be protected.', 49 Legislators concluded that "current
FOIA requirements create greater burdens and risks for the CIA
than is necessary to achieve the essential goal of preserving full access
to significant information. ""0
The CIA Information Act of 1984 is especially relevant to this
analysis, as will be demonstrated later in this article, because unlike
the National Security Act, Congress passed the CIA Information Act
after the FOIA was enacted. An examination of the 1984 legislation
shows that it explicitly recognizes CIA disclosure obligations under
the FOIA 5'
III. CIA v. Sims-Carte Blanche Secrecy
The clash between the legitimate and competing policy
objectives of the FOIA and the National Security Act, which pit
144. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742-3743.
145. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 193 (Marshall, J., concurring).
146. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742.
147. Id.
148. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 6 (1984) (testimony by Frank Carlucci to the House
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3744.
149. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
150. Id.
151. See CIA Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477,98 Stat. 2209-2212 (1984).
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transparency against secrecy, lies at the heart of CIA v. Sims.152 In
Sims, secrecy prevailed. As a result, the CIA has been exempt for the
last two decades from releasing virtually any information that the
Director of Central Intelligence merely contends may qualify as, or
compromise, a source of intelligence. 53 Under this sweeping Sims
standard, the Court established that the CIA:
" Need not go through a classification process to withhold
information.' 54
" Is not subject to judicial review to confirm that purportedly
classified information was properly classified under an
Executive Order. 155
" Can withhold unclassified information, regardless of how
dated, how seemingly innocuous or how trivial it may be.
1
-
6
" Need not assert that a disclosure conceivably could affect
national security, nor even argue that it could reasonably be
expected to cause identifiable damage.
" Is not required to show that an "intelligence source" had
requested confidentiality. 1
The facts in CIA v. Sims concerned a FOIA request for records
detailing a series of CIA-financed psychological experiments
conducted in the United States between 1953 and 1966."59 Code-
named Project MKULTRA, the experiments were undertaken to
counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and
interrogation techniques.16° At least eighty private and public research
facilities-including major American universities, hospitals and
prisons 161-and 185 researchers participated in the then-secret project
152. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
153. See, e.g., Assassination Archives and Research Center v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Center for National Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 1996); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1993); Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993); Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.
1992); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1989); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Rubin v. CIA, 01 CIV. 2274 (DLC), LEXIS 19413 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2001);
Federation of American Scientists v. CIA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135 (D.D.C. Nov. 12,
1999); U.S. Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620 F.Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1985).
154. Sims, 471 U.S. at 183-84 (Marshall, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 178.
157. Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring).
15& Id.
159. Id. at 161-62.
160. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-62.
161. Included among the universities that were identified are Harvard, Princeton,
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in which unwitting subjects were observed after they were given
experimental drugs such as LSD and mescaline.6 2 In some cases,
subjects were picked up in bars by CIA-hired prostitutes, given drugs
and then taken for observation to safehouses in New York and San
Francisco equipped with recording devices and two-way mirrors. 6 As
a result of these experiments and illegal activities, at least two persons
died, and others suffered impaired health.' 64
Information about the MKULTRA project and other
questionable CIA activities, such as domestic spying during the
socially turbulent Vietnam War years, was leaked to the press and
widely reported.' 6' Congress subsequently launched a wide-ranging
investigation into CIA operations. It was while these hearings were
taking place that Public Citizen, a Ralph Nader organization,
requested the CIA's MKULTRA records under the FOIA. Public
Citizen attorney John Cary Sims asked the CIA to disclose the names
of the research facilities, the identities of the researchers, and the
details of the project's research contracts and grants.' 66 The CIA
Cornell, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Michigan and Stanford
University School of Medicine. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 85 n. 2 (1979).
162. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-62.
163. MARTIN A. LEE AND BRUCE SHLAIN, ACID DREAMS: THE CIA, LSD, AND THE
SIXTIES REBELLION 32 (1985).
164. Sims, 471 U.S. at 159-60, 162 n.4. See also LEE & SHLAIN, supra note 163, at 29-
31. These CIA psychological tests were an illegal violation of the charter that established
the Agency. Under the National Security Act, the CIA was specifically denied powers of
domestic intelligence gathering, specifically, "no police, subpoena, or law enforcement
powers or internal security functions." Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3), codified at 50
U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1). See also THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
165. News reports that the CIA had engaged in illegal activities and abuses, such as
the MKULTRA psychological experiments and domestic spying on Vietnam War
opponents, were published in late 1974 by The New York Times. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh,
Huge CIA Operation Reported in US. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at Al, A16. Additional news reports by Hersh and
others on allegations of CIA abuses prompted a series of congressional investigations and
hearings, beginning with an investigation by an executive committee chaired by Vice
President Nelson Rockefeller. The resulting Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975
disclosed details of the CIA's covert domestic operation into brainwashing and behavior-
modification techniques between 1953 and 1966. As a result of the report, Sen. Frank
Church was named to head a Senate committee to investigate those and other allegations
further. Sims v. CIA (Sims 1), 642 F.2d 562, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also BOB
WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE 42
(1999). The illegal CIA activities disclosed by the Rockefeller Commission and Church
Committee have been widely reported over the years in the news media and numerous
secondary sources. For a highly readable and detailed account of the CIA's MKULTRA
misdeeds, see LEE & SHLAIN, supra note 163.
166. Sims, 471 U.S. at 162-64. A second respondent, Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., was
director of Public Citizen Health Research Group. Id. at 162-63.
HOLDING THE SPYMASTERS ACCOUNTABLE AFTER 9/11
disclosed the names of fifty-nine research facilities and the terms of
the contracts, but refused to name twenty-one other facilities and
kept secret the identities of all the project's researchers.'67
Public Citizen sued to obtain the records, setting into motion an
eight-year-long court fight that ended in 1985 when the Supreme
Court ruled that the CIA could withhold the information because the
National Security Act'68 granted the Director of Central Intelligence
broad and unreviewable discretion to safeguard "intelligence sources
and methods" from unauthorized disclosure.'69 That decision was
based in great part on a Supreme Court-crafted definition of
"intelligence sources" because, as noted earlier, Congress did not
define the term in the National Security Act.7° The precise meaning
of exactly who or what qualified as an "intelligence source" surfaced
as the salient issue throughout the lengthy and contentious Sims
proceedings."'
167. Id. at 163. It was revealed during the Church Committee Hearings that in 1973
CIA Director Richard Helms had ordered all MKULTRA records and documents
destroyed to avoid their ever being disclosed. However, in a bizarre twist, a CIA staff
member discovered about 8,000 pages of documents that inadvertently escaped
destruction. The information sought by attorney Sims was contained in these records. Id.
at n. 5. See also JAMES X. DEMPSEY, The CIA and Secrecy, in A CULTURE OF SECRECY:
THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 41-42 (Athan G. Theoharis
ed., University Press of Kansas 1998).
168. 50 U.S.C. § 403(3).
169. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 174-77.
170. Id.
171. CIA v. Sims had a long history before reaching the Supreme Court. The case was
initially argued before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Sims v. CIA,
479 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1979). District court decisions were appealed twice to two
separate panels of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in suits
commonly referred to as Sims I and Sims H. Sims v. CIA (Sims 1), 642 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir.
1980) & Sims v. CIA (Sims II), 709 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The definition of "intelligence sources" was the focus of each decision in this
series of opinions. The D.C. District Court held that the names of institutions and
researchers could not be withheld because they were not "intelligence sources" within the
meaning of Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3).
The district court reasoned that in order for the CIA director to declare the researchers to
be "intelligence sources," there must be "clear, non-discretionary guidelines to test
whether an intelligence source is involved in a particular case." Sims, 479 F.Supp. at 87-88.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court's analysis of Section 102(d)(3)
lacked a coherent definition of "intelligence sources." In Sims I, the D.C. Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration based on a definition of
"intelligence sources" crafted by the appellate court:
[A]n 'intelligence source' is a person or institution that provides, has provided or
has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency
needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably
expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentially of those who provide it.
Sims 1, 642 F.2d at 571. On remand, the district court held that the CIA should disclose the
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A. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
CIA v. Sims reached the Supreme Court after the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit defined an "intelligence
source" to be someone who is promised confidentiality and whose
information could not be obtained through other means.1 12 Under this
D.C. Circuit definition, the CIA would have been required to release
the names of MKULTRA researchers who did not explicitly request
confidentiality. Both the CIA and John Cary Sims appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court; the Agency wanted to withhold all the
names, and FOIA requester Sims wanted all the identities disclosed.
In the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger and
joined by six justices, the Court framed two principal issues in Sims v.
CIA.'73 First, the Court considered the threshold question of whether
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act, the provision that
authorized the protection of "intelligence sources and methods,"
qualified as a withholding statute under FOIA Exemption 3.174
Second, the Court considered whether the MKULTRA researchers
qualified as "intelligence sources" under Section 102(d)(3).'75 The
Court's discussion of whether Section 102(d)(3) qualified as a
withholding statute covered only three pages17 6 of the thirty-five page
Sims opinion, but this brief discussion has had far-reaching
consequences: The Sims Court majority decisively affirmed the CIA's
central argument that the National Security Act granted broad and
unreviewable authority to the Director of Central Intelligence to
protect "intelligence sources and methods" from unauthorized
disclosure. 177
To resolve the second issue-the definition of the term
"intelligence sources"-the Court needed to decide several corollary
questions: whether the term "intelligence sources," contained in
identities of those researchers who did not request confidentiality, thus complying with the
prescribed definition of "intelligence source." Sims II, 709 F.2d at 97. On a second appeal,
the D.C. Circuit held that the district court incorrectly applied the definition of
"intelligence sources." Sims II, 709 F.2d at 9& In Sims II, the D.C. Circuit clarified that a
researcher could be considered an "intelligence source" only if the researcher is promised
confidentiality, and the information provided by the researcher could not be obtained
through other means. Id. at 99-100. After the D.C. Circuit's Sims II decision, both sides
appealed to the Supreme Court. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
172. Sims II, 709 F.2d at 99-100.
173. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167.
174. Id. at 167 & 177-81.
175. Id. at 167 & 175-77.
176. Id. at 166-68.
177. Id. at 177-81.
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118
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act, was correctly
defined by the D.C. Circuit; 9 whether the Project MKULTRA
researchers would qualify as intelligence sources under Section
102(d)(3);' 8 and whether disclosure of the requested information,
such as researcher identities and research facilities, would reveal
protected information.
181
The Supreme Court objected to the D.C. Circuit's definition of
"intelligence sources," reasoning that it was too narrowly drawn and
consequently would result in disclosure of more information than
should be made public. t8 In the Court's view, a narrow interpretation
of "intelligence sources" ignores the practical necessities of
intelligence gathering and the unique responsibilities of the Agency.'
83
Burger said Section 102(d)(3) "may not be squared with any limitingdefinition. ' '
To keep informed of other nations' activities bearing on our
national security, the Agency must rely on a host of sources. At the
same time, the Director must have the authority to shield those
Agency activities and sources from any disclosure that would
unnecessarily compromise the Agency's efforts.
85
The Court thus rejected the appellate court's suggestion that the
CIA director is authorized to protect intelligence sources only if such
confidentiality is needed to obtain information that otherwise could
not be acquired.'s Had Congress so intended, Burger wrote, it would
have drafted legislation that narrows the category of protected
sources."' He noted, for example, that in Exemption 7 of the FOIA'88
and in the Privacy Act, Congress explicitly protected sources that
provided information under a promise of confidentiality.' 9
Accordingly, the Court fashioned a new definition: "An
intelligence source provides, or is engaged to provide, information the
Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations.., related to the
178. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3).
179. Sims 1, 642 F.2d at 571.
180. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167.
181. Id. at 168.
182. Id. at 169-70.
183. Id. at 169.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Sims, 471 U.S. at 169.
187. Id.
188. Id., citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). Exemption 7 exempts certain law enforcement
records from disclosure.
189. Id., citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2) & (5).
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Agency's intelligence function."1" Burger said the Supreme Court's
definition of "intelligence sources" comports with the National
Security Act's plain meaning and legislative history, which suggest a
broad authority for the CIA director to protect all sources of
intelligence information from disclosure. 9' In relying on this
legislative history to support the Court's construction of "intelligence
sources," Burger noted testimony from congressional hearings on the
establishment of the CIA, 92 such as the aforementioned remarks by
former CIA Director Dulles and Congress members Wadsworth and
Boggs.' 93 Burger said their testimony reflected the need for an
"extraordinary diversity" of sources of information. 94
Burger also pointed to the legislative history of the CIA
Information Act of 1984195 to support the CIA's use of Exemption 3
and Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act as grounds to
withhold the requested information.' 96 If potentially valuable
intelligence sources believe the CIA will be unable to maintain their
anonymity, Burger reasoned, many might refuse to supply
information to the Agency.' 97 "[Florced disclosure of the identities of
intelligence sources could well have a devastating impact on the
Agency's ability to carry out its mission," he wrote. 98 Burger argued
that the government has a compelling interest in protecting not only
secret information crucial to national security but also the appearance
of confidentiality, which is essential to the effective operation of the
CIA.19 Burger cited testimony by Dulles, who said that even
American citizens who freely supply intelligence information would
"close up like a clam" unless they can count on the government for
complete confidentiality."
190. Id. at 177. It is noteworthy that the source for this definition was the CIA itself.
The original language for the CIA's proposed definition for "intelligence sources" can be
found in Agency briefs filed with the D.C. Circuit in Sims L 642 F.2d at 576 n.1.
191. Sims, 471 U.S. at 169-170, 173.
192. Id. at 171-72.
193. See supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text.
194. Sims, 471 U.S. at 171.
195. CIA Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477,98 Stat. 2009 (1984).
196. Sims, 471 U.S. at 168 n.l & 174 n.19.
197. Id. at 169.
19& Id. at 175.
199. Id., citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (holding that the
CIA can enforce a nondisclosure agreement with a former CIA official who wrote a book
about the Vietnam War containing nonclassified information about the Agency).
200. Sims, 471 U.S. at 175.
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Throughout its analysis of the issues in Sims, the majority
opinion repeatedly emphasized the importance of showing "great
deference" to CIA discretion, particularly decisions made by the
Director of Central Intelligence to withhold information under the
FOIA.201 In the first place, Burger wrote that the Director of Central
Intelligence is specifically granted broad powers through statutory
authority, namely Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act.2°
Furthermore, the granting of such power to the CIA chief is good
policy because the director is the only person familiar with the whole
intelligence picture and is thus best suited to determine whether
individual bits of information-although not obviously important by
themselves-can, in their aggregate, reveal intelligence sources and
methods.23 "The decisions of the Director, who must of course be
familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of
great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests
and potential risks at stake," 2°4 Burger wrote. He explicitly rejected
the idea that judges should have the power of de novo review in
FOIA litigation for CIA-held information. 2°5 Burger asserted that de
novo review in CIA cases poses inherent dangers because judges have
"little or no background in the delicate business of intelligence
gathering."206
B. The Marshall Concurrence
In a concurrence to Sims, written by Justice Thurgood Marshall
and joined by Justice William J. Brennan, the two jurists agreed with
the outcome of the opinion: The definition of "intelligence sources"
crafted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
was too narrow and limited, and to apply it to the Sims case would
release more material than should be disclosed. 2°7 However, they
objected in strongly worded terms with the majority on two important
issues. First, the concurring justices argued that the Court majority's
broad definition of "intelligence sources" exceeded the plain meaning
and legislative history of "any congressional act," and that it
conflicted directly with the FOIA's broad mandate for disclosure.?
201. Id. at 179.
202. Id. at 170.
203. Id. at 178.
204. Id. at 179.
205. Id. at 176.
206. Id.
207. Sims, 471 U.S. at 181-82, 194 (Marshall, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
20041
110 HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J. [27:1
Second, they argued that the Court majority should have ordered the
CIA to justify withholding under Exemption 1, and not under
Exemption 3. 209 They contended that by relying on Exemption 3, the
CIA "cleverly evaded" judicial de novo review2 0 as required by
Exemption 1, and thus thwarted an important check created by
Congress specifically to limit federal agency discretion in withholding
decisions.211
Marshall acknowledged that the D.C. Circuit Court's definition
for "intelligence sources" was too narrow, but he asserted that the
Supreme Court majority went to the other extreme.212 He rejected the
majority definition of "intelligence source," contending that its broad
construction improperly equates "intelligence source" with the
broader term, "information source., 213 Under the majority definition,
he argued, even newspapers, road maps, and telephone books would
fall under the Court's definition of "intelligence sources," thereby
casting an unreviewable presumption of secrecy over an "expansive
array of information" held by the CIA.214
According to Marshall, the term "intelligence source" does not
have any single and readily apparent definition compelled by the
plain language of Section 102(d)(3), as the majority justices
contended.215 He wrote that the legislative history of the National
Security Act suggests only a congressional intent to protect
individuals who might be harmed or silenced if they were identified.2 6
"The heart of the issue is whether the term 'intelligence source'
connotes that which is confidential or clandestine, and the answer is
far from obvious, 217 he wrote. Marshall offered a compromise
definition, which he said comports with the statutory language and
legislative history of the National Security Act while also falling
within the congressionally imposed limits on the CIA's exercise of
discretion.21s He interpreted "intelligence sources" to refer only to
sources who provide information either on an expressed or implied
209. Id. at 189-90 (Marshall, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 189 (Marshall, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
213. Sims, 471 U.S. at 187 (Marshall, J., concurring). Burger wrote that even disclosure
of "an obscure but publicly available Eastern European technical journal could thwart the
Agency's efforts to exploit its value as a source of intelligence information." Id. at 177.
214. Id. at 191 (Marshall, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 187 (Marshall, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 187 (Marshall, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 186 (Marshall, J., concurring).
218. Id.
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promise of confidentiality."9 Marshall defended his definition, arguing
that it would meet the CIA's concerns about confidentiality because it
would protect not only "intelligence sources" but also protect the
kind of information that would lead to identifying such a source.2
The Marshall concurrence also parted ways with the majority
over the CIA's use of Exemption 3 to withhold the requested records.
Because the CIA was allowed to sidestep Exemption 1, Marshall said
the Agency circumvented requirements "carefully crafted" by
Congress to "limit the Agency's discretion." 22 In the view of Marshall
and Brennan, the CIA should have cited Exemption 1,222 the national
security exemption, to withhold the Project MKULTRA
information 2 3 Marshall pointed out that Exemption 1 would have
allowed for the same outcome-the withholding of the researchers'
identities-while at the same time recognizing limits on Agency
discretion. 2n Exemption 1 imposes two restrictions on a federal
agency's discretion to withhold a record. 22' The first check is
procedural in that an agency is not the judge of what can be classified;
this determination is made by each presidential administration under
an Executive Order.) Second, the judiciary has an important
227
checking role through de novo review. Under this power of judicial
review in Exemption 1 cases, the courts have the authority to confirm
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 189 (Marshall, J., concurring).
222. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
223. When the case was first heard by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, the court held that the names of institutions and researchers could not be
withheld because they were not "intelligence sources" within the meaning of Section
102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947. Sims v. CIA, 479 F. Supp. 84, 87-88
(D.D.C. 1979). However, District Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, who wrote the opinion, said
that the names of the researchers could be classified for national security reasons under
Exemption 1 to withhold their identities. Although the court issued its opinion on Aug. 7,
1979, Oberdorfer set forward the effective date of the ruling to Oct. 1, 1979 to give the
CIA time to classify the requested information so that it could be withheld under the
national security exemption. Oberdorfer indicated his willingness to reconsider the CIA's
decision to withhold the MKULTRA information if the Agency claimed Exemption 1
protection. Id. at 87-88. However, the CIA stuck with its Exemption 3 strategy throughout
the appeals process.
224. Marshall observed that under President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order on
classification, in effect at the time, "the Agency need make but a limited showing to a
court to invoke Exemption 1 for that material." Sims, 471 U.S. at 190 n. 6 (Marshall, J.,
concurring), citing Exec. Order No. 12356, 3 CFR 166 (1983).
225. 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(b)(1) (1989).
226. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
227. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
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that records asserted to be classified were classified according to
guidelines established by an Executive Order.m
Marshall observed that Exemption 1 properly cloaks "classes of
information that warrant protection, as long as the government
proceeds through a publicly issued, congressionally scrutinized and
judicially enforced executive order. '' 29 He characterized the national
security exemption as the keystone of a congressional system that
balances deference to the executive branch's interest in maintaining
secrecy with continued oversight by the judicial and congressional
branches of government.2 "Congress, it is clear, sought to assure that
the government would not operate behind a veil of secrecy, and it
narrowly tailored the exceptions to the fundamental goal of
disclosure," Marshall wrote.2I The Marshall-Brennan concurrence
concluded, therefore, that the Sims Court majority allowed the CIA
to evade and undermine congressionally imposed requirements to
constrain Agency discretion under the "carefully crafted balance
embodied in Exemption 1 .,,32
IV. Sims as Precedent
Although the Sims Court majority gave the Director of Central
Intelligence sweeping and uncurbed discretion to withhold documents
and records over a boundless class of information, 23 some lower
courts have expressed their disagreement with the Supreme Court
ruling. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
observed that the result of denying a FOIA request for an
unclassified CIA record may well be contrary to what Congress
intended' 35 The Ninth Circuit noted that a congressional report,
issued only one year before the Court decided Sims, stated that "the
FOIA has 'played a vital part in maintaining the American people's
faith in their government, and particularly in agencies like the CIA.'
228. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). "(T)he court shall determine the matter de novo,
and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether
such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in
subsection (b) of this section." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). See also H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at
12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6290.
229. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 183 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring), citing S. REP. No. 89-813, at 10 (1965).
232- Id. at 189-90 (Marshall, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 191-92 (Marshall, J., concurring).
234. See, e.g., Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1992); Knight v. CIA, 872
F.2d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
235. Hunt, 981 F.2d at 1120.
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Whether or not that was actually the case at one time, it certainly is
not true now, at least insofar as the CIA is concerned.... [N]othing in
statute or case precedent permits us to reach a different result than
Sims and the other cases command." 23 And The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that under Sims, lower courts
are constrained from ruling in favor of FOIA challenges when it
comes to CIA withholding decisions: "[o]nce the DCI makes that
[nondisclosure] determination, the Supreme Court effectively held,
the matter is beyond the purview of the courts." 37 In other words, the
lower courts recognized the importance of the FOIA but had no
choice but to follow Sims.
Over the last twenty years the influence of Sims as precedent has
blocked access to CIA-held information in a long line of cases that
cover a variety of issues of public interest. 38 Since 2001, for example,
decisions by three appellate courts and one district court have upheld
CIA decisions to withhold information of news value and public
interest,239 of historical importance, 240 of commercial and business
interest24' and of scholarly-research value. 242
In the most recent case to date, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2004
let stand a decision by the D.C. Circuit that relied on Sims to permit
the government to withhold basic information on persons detained
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, including their names,
their attorneys' names, dates of arrest or release, locations of arrest
and detention, and reasons for detention. 243 In Center for National
Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, the government cited Sims at least
eleven times as the legal authority to withhold information on the
236. Id., citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-477, at 9 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3791,
3747.
237. See Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660,664 (5th Cir. 1989).
23& See Arabian Shield Dev. Co. v. CIA, No. 3-98-CV-0624-BD, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2379, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1999), affd per curiam, 208 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000); Assassination Archives and Research Ctr. v. CIA,
334 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. , 2003); Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004); Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796 (9th Cir.
1996); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1993); Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249 (1st
Cir. 1993); Hunt, 981 F.2d 1116; Knight, 872 F.2d 660; Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Rubin v. CIA, 01 CIV. 2274 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19413
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2001); Fed'n of Am. Scientists v. CIA, No. 98-2107, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18135 (Nov. 15, 1999); U.S. Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620 F. Supp. 565 (D.D.C. 1985).
239. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d 918.
240. See Assassination Archives, 334 F.3d 55.
241. See Arabian Shield, No. 3-98-CV-0624-BD, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2379, at *1.
242. See Rubin, 01 CIV. 2274 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19413, at *1.
243. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d 918. See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices
Allow Policy of Silence on 9/11 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at Al.
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detainees that had been obtained or held by the CIA.24 This suit was
filed to challenge the secrecy surrounding the arrest and detention of
hundreds of people, mostly Muslim men, after the September 11
attacks.2 45 The D.C. Circuit Court had affirmed a D.C. District Court
decision upholding the Bush Administration's argument that to
disclose a list of names would give terrorist organizations a
"composite picture of the government investigation."2 46 The D.C.
Circuit majority said the "judiciary owes some measure of deference"
to the executive in cases where national security is at stake.247
Dissenting appeals judge David S. Tatel said the majority had
"converted deference into acquiescence" by allowing the government
to engage in a policy of blanket secrecy
In another FOIA case, the D.C. Circuit held in 2003 that the CIA
did not have to release a 1962 compilation of biographies of
important Cuban leaders. 249 In Assassination Archives and Research
Center v. CIA, the appeals court accepted the CIA's argument that
under FOIA Exemption 3, the Agency was not bound to comply with
the disclosure requirements of the JFK Assassination Records Act
(JFK Act) or the FOIA.25 The appellate court affirmed the D.C.
District Court decision and rejected arguments by the Assassination
Archives and Research Center that the CIA needed to show why at
least some portions of the compendium should not be disclosed. Nor
was the appeals court moved by the plaintiff's assertions that the
information about Cuban leaders in 1962 already had been disclosed
(though not by the CIA) under the JFK Act.251 Appeals judges upheld
the CIA's argument that to reveal even the names of the individuals
or the number of names contained in the compendium would "reveal
CIA interest" and the "extent of the U.S. intelligence collection effort
directed at Cuba in the 1960's. ' ,212 The appellate court echoed the
Supreme Court's central holding in Sims-that the National Security
244. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d 918. Center for National Security Studies
focused principally on Exemption 7, the FOIA exemption for certain law enforcement
records. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(2000).
245. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d 918.
246. Id. at 928. This suit focused principally on Exemption 7, which permits the
government to withhold certain law enforcement records. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
247. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926-27.
248. Id. at 940 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
249. See Assassination Archives and Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
250. Id. at 58-59.
251. Id. at 59.
252. Id. at 58.
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Act protected all CIA records from disclosure at the director's
discretion. "Given our deference to the Agency's judgment on the
matter," the court said, "we uphold the Agency's determination that
disclosure of the compendium, even in light of the JFK Act
disclosures, 'can reasonably be expected to lead to the disclosure of
intelligence sources and methods."' 3
In Arabian Shield Development Co. v. CIA, the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Texas district court
decision that the CIA could deny a request for records that may
reveal the involvement of the CIA in the awarding of an oil
production agreement with the former Yemen Arab Republic. The
events leading to this suit began in the 1980s when Arabian Shield
Development Co. and Hunt Oil Co. submitted competing bids for the
agreement. The contract was awarded to Hunt Oil. Arabian Shield
then filed a complaint with the Department of Justice because the
company suspected that Hunt Oil had won the bid through bribery.55
The complaint charged that Hunt Oil conspired with Yemeni officials
in violation of the Foreign Corruption Practices Act. Arabian Shield
sought records of communications among Hunt Oil principals,
Yemeni officials and the CIA.2 6 The Agency argued that the
information was classified, but Arabian Shield countered that it was
improperly classified because national security cannot be used to
conceal information pertaining to the commission of a crime. 57 The
appellate court held that the documents were properly classified.
However, it also noted that regardless of whether the information was
classified, "the unique nature of the Agency's mandate [under the
National Security Act] gives it broad power to protect intelligence
sources and methods." Quoting Sims, the court said: "[iut is the
responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, not of the
judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in
determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an
unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency's intelligence-
gathering process." 2 9
253. Id. at 59.
254. Arabian Shield v. CIA, No. 3-98-CV-0624-BD, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2379, at
*14 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 1999).
255. Id. at *1.
256. Id. at *2-3.
257. Id.
258. Id. at *13.
259. Id.
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In a case that departs somewhat from the hard-edged issues
behind the U.S. war on terrorism, the Cuban revolution and Middle
East oil rights, the CIA denied a request from a Columbia University
doctoral student who inquired about the participation of famed
British writers Stephen Spender and T.S. Eliot in a now-defunct CIA-
financed cultural organization.2' In its 2001 decision in Rubin v. CIA,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld
the CIA's decision to neither confirm nor deny that it possessed
records on any involvement in the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a
CIA-funded organization that promoted anti-communist conferences,
periodicals and events worldwide.61 The student, Andrew Rubin, was
a Ph.D. candidate in the Columbia English department writing his
dissertation on literary and cultural criticism during the Cold War.
Part of his research focused on how criticism was influenced by
American ideology of the time, and he requested CIA records on
Spender and Eliot, who died in 1995 and 1965, respectively.
Rubin argued that the information was improperly withheld for
two reasons. First, the writers were dead. 262 Second, their involvement
in the Congress for Cultural Freedom had already been disclosed in a
book entitled The Cultural Cold War, which revealed covert CIA
financing of writers and artists to promote U.S. interests abroad.2 6
The CIA argued that it could neither confirm nor deny the existence
of any such records because such information would be exempt from
disclosure under Exemption 3 and the National Security Act of
1947.26' In addition, the district court echoed another of the holdings
in Sims-one that also came up in the D.C. Circuit's Assassinations
Archives case2---that the age of a requested document cannot be
considered when determining whether it should be released.266
Besides these most recent cases, appellate courts for the First,
Fifth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits decided six FOIA cases that followed
Sims from 1989 to 1996,267 and the District Court for the District of
260. Rubin v. CIA, 01 CIV. 2274 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19413, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,2001).
261. Id. at *3.
262 Id. at *13.
263. Id. at *14.
264. Id at *15.
265. Assassination Archives and Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
266. Rubin, 01 CIV. 2274 (DLC), LEXIS 19413, at *14.
267. Minier v. CIA, 88 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 1996); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1993); Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993); Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.
1992); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660 (5th
Cir. 1989).
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Columbia ruled on four such cases from 1985 to 1999.6 8 For example,
the circuit court rulings denied requests for:
" Documents concerning the disappearance of a pilot during a
flight over Cuba in 1961. The FOIA request was made by his
former wife in 1993.269
" Background information on a murder victim, who was an
Iranian national with ties to the CIA. The information was
requested during the pretrial discovery process by the murder
defendant, who was on trial in California. °
" Access to twenty-five-year-old CIA records on an alleged plot
by Dominican Republic government agents to kidnap
President John F. Kennedy's daughter, Caroline.21 The
information was requested by a historian.
* Information concerning the mysterious 1985 sabotage of the
Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow Warrior," which sank in the
harbor at Auckland, New Zealand, after a bomb attached to
its hull exploded.272 The request came from a Greenpeace
activist.
V. The Argument for a Congressional Remedy
As this article has attempted to show, the Supreme Court's
decision to grant the Director of Central Intelligence uncurbed
authority to withhold information is at odds with the FOIA.273
Congress consistently has supported a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure grounded in the accountability principle of
democracy, which empowers the public with a right to know what
their government is up to.2 4
268. Fed'n of Am. Scientists v. CIA, No. 98-2107, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135
(D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1999); Fitzgibbon v. Secret Serv., 747 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1990); Allen v.
Dep't of Defense, 658 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1986); U.S. Student Ass'n v. CIA, 620 F. Supp.
565 (D.D.C. 1985).
269. Maynard, 986 F.2d 547.
270. Hunt, 981 F.2d 1116.
271. Fitzgibbon, 911 F. 2d 755.
272- Knight, 872 F.2d 660.
273. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
274. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966); S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965); H.R.
REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974): H.R. REP. No. 94-880,
pt. 1, at 23 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at Sec. 2(a)(3)&(4) (1996). The Supreme Court
has consistently recognized this principle. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 510
U.S. 487, 494 (1994); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 755 (1989); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 221 (1978); U.S.
Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-361 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80
(1973).
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A. Contravening Legislative Intent
The record shows that legislators enacted the FOIA to "pierce
the veil" of government secrecy275 and provide a check against
corruption by holding government officials accountable to the
public.276 The legislative history of the FOIA shows that Congress,
through the statute's nine exemptions, also recognized that the
Executive Branch has a legitimate need to keep some information
confidential.m Legislators emphasized, however, that the exemptions
are to be narrowly construed and limited in their scope, and that
disclosure, not secrecy, is the FOIA's dominant objective. 2  As
outlined earlier, Congress' FOIA reform amendments in 197427' and
in 19762 evince a legislative intent to place strict limits on agency
discretion.
The Supreme Court majority opinion in CIA v. Sims discounted
this extensive history, 28' and instead based its rationale principally on
the National Security Act of 1947. 2 By doing so, the Court failed to
engage in a true balancing test-as prescribed by Congress-to weigh
the public's interest in disclosure against the CIA's interests in
secrecy.) The Court erred further by engaging in a highly selective
reading of a crucial amendment to the National Security Act-the
CIA Information Act of 1984.2m Indeed, the CIA Information Act of
1984 holds special significance because-unlike the National Security
Act of 1947-it was passed after the FOIA was enacted, and it
directly addresses Agency disclosure obligations.28
The Sims majority opinion focused mainly on a provision of the
CIA Information Act that makes "operational files" confidential,28
while it ignored key language that allows only limited agency
275. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (quoting Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d. 261, 263
(1974)).
276. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 242.
277. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1-9).
278. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (quoting Rose, 495 F.2d. at 263).
279. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
280. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
281. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966); S. REp. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965); H.R.
REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 94-880,
at pt. 1, 23 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at Sec. 2(a)(3)&(4)(1996).
282. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167-173 (1985).
283. See S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3.
284. 50 U.S.C. § 431, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984).
285. See 50 U.S.C. § 431, 98 Stat. 2209, 2209-2210.
286. Sims, 471 U.S. at 168 n.11 & 174 n.19.
discretion over all other CIA documents and records. 28 The House
report that accompanied the CIA Information Act clearly stated that
one of the purposes for exempting operational files was to improve
the CIA's ability to respond to FOIA requests "in a timely and
efficient manner, while preserving undiminished the amount of
meaningful information releasable to the public." 28 The report
declared:
The Agency's acceptance of the obligation under the FOIA to
provide information to the public not exempted under the FOIA is
one of the linchpins of this legislation. The [FOIA] has played a
vital part in maintaining the American people's faith in their
government, and particularly in agencies like the CIA that must
necessarily operate in secrecy. In a free society, a national security
agency's ability to serve the national interest depends as much on
public confidence that its powers will not be misused as it does on the
confidence of intelligence sources that their relationships with the
CIA will be protected.28
The Burger opinion failed to consider several provisions in the
CIA Information Act that evinced congressional intent to limit CIA
discretion and make the Agency more accountable to Congress, the
courts and the general public.2'9 For example, the Act states that
operational files "shall continue to be subject to search and review"
for information subject to investigations by Congress, the
Department of Justice or other investigatory bodies into improper or
unlawful activities. 9' Further, the CIA Information Act reiterates that
the FOIA establishes that judicial review, including in camera
inspection, is available to a FOIA requester who alleges that the CIA
has improperly withheld a record.292 Another provision limiting
blanket CIA discretion requires that the Agency consult with the
Archivist of the United States, the Librarian of Congress and
appropriate representatives selected by the Archivist in order to
conduct periodic and systematic reviews of documents for their
historical value, their declassification, and their release.293
In addition to the selective reading of the FOIA and the National
Security Act, another problem is that the Sims Court's rationale was
grounded, in large part, on the flawed principle of "great deference."
287. See 50 U.S.C. § 431, 98 Stat. 2209, 2209-2210.
288. H.R. REP. No. 98-726, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3742.
289. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747 (emphasis added).
290. 50 U.S.C. § 431, 98 Stat. 2209, 2209-2210.
291. 50 U.S.C. § 431.
292. 50 U.S.C. § 431, 98 Stat. 2210.
293. 50 U.S.C. § 431.
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B. The Myth of "Great Deference"
Under the theory of "great deference,"2  the CIA alone is in the
unique position of being best able to determine whether information
it possesses poses a danger to national defense and foreign relations.29
Burger wrote that the CIA director is the only person familiar with
the whole picture-the only one able to observe each individual piece
of intelligence information and tie them all together, even when a
single piece is not obviously important by itself.29 A review of the
pertinent federal case law shows that this "mosaic" or "compilation"
theory was first accepted by the judiciary in a 1972 decision by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.2 7 Although this theory
had been applied in other cases after 1972,m it was not until CIA v.
Sims that this rationale for withholding was endorsed by the Supreme
Court.299
294. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985).
295. Id. at 178.
296. Id.
297. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("What may
seem trivial to the uninformed may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view
of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context").
298. See, e.g., Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. DOD, 831 F.2d 441, 444-45 (3d Cir.
1987)(recognizing "compilation" theory)(decided under Executive Order 12,356);
Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (explicitly acknowledging
"mosaic-like nature of intelligence gathering") (decided under Executive Order 12,065);
Taylor v. Dep't of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding classification of
compilation of information on army combat units) (decided under Executive Order
12,065); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Observing that a piece of
intelligence is like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, not of obvious importance by itself). See also
Loomis v. United States Dep't of Energy, No. 96-CV-149, 1999 WL 33541935 at *5, 7(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1999) (finding that safety measures regarding nuclear facilities set forth
in manuals and lay-out plans contain highly technical information and that "such
information in the aggregate could reveal sensitive aspects of operations") (decided under
Executive Order 12,958), affd, 21 Fed. Appx. 80 (2d Cir. 2001); Nat'l Sec. Archive v. FBI,
759 F. Supp. 872, 877 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that disclosure of code names and designator
phrases could provide a hostile intelligence analyst with a "common denominator"
permitting the analyst to piece together seemingly unrelated data into a snapshot of
specific FBI counterintelligence activity) (decided under Executive Order 12,356); Jan-Xin
Zang v. FBI, 756 F. Supp. 705, 709-10 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding classification of any
particular source identifying word or phrase that could by itself or in aggregate lead to
disclosure of intelligence source) (decided under Executive Order 12,356).
299. Sims, 471 U.S. at 178, quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at 150 ("Each individual piece
of intelligence information, much like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing
together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious
importance in itself"). In CIA v. Sims the Supreme Court recognized the statutory
authority of the National Security Ac of 1947 as a broad basis to defend CIA secrecy at
the discretion of the Director of Central Intelligence. 471 U.S. at 167-68. However, the
issue of CIA secrecy had been raised frequently in lower federal courts before then.
According to Professors Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., the government's first
HOLDING THE SPYMASTERS ACCOUNTABLE AFTER 9/11
The recent findings by the 9/11 Commission" and the Senate and
House joint panel investigation into the terrorist attacks3°' clearly and
dramatically illustrate the fallibility of the "great deference"
rationale, which supports broad authority for unreviewable CIA
secrecy and effectively blocks efforts by the public and the press to
evaluate the Agency's performance. Among other findings, the two
government investigations revealed:
* The CIA had intelligence in its files since 1998 indicating that
al Qaeda had plans to hijack passenger planes and use them as
weapons, but the Agency's Counterterrorist Center never
developed a plan to deal with that threat. 3°2
* For nearly two years before the attacks, the CIA had been
aware of the terrorist connections of two of the hijackers,
Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq al Hazmi, who had moved to
San Diego, California, in 2000.3
" Former CIA chief George J. Tenet was "either unwilling or
unable to marshal the full range of intelligence community
resources necessary to combat the growing threat" of
terrorism.34
big victory in the legal battles to protect CIA secrecy began with an attempt by Victor
Marchetti, a former top CIA official, to write a book after he left the Agency. Edgar &
Schmidt, supra note 32, at 368. The D.C. Circuit held that Marchetti must submit his book
for censorship. See Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1318. The next big victory for CIA secrecy came
with court approval of the so-called Glomar response, which permits the CIA to respond
to a FOIA request by saying the Agency can "neither confirm nor deny" the existence of a
document for national security reasons. This response was first accepted by a court in 1976
when a journalist requested information about a research ship called the Hughes Glomar
Explorer. The CIA spent more than $350 million in building this vessel in a joint project
with the late Howard Hughes in an effort to raise a Soviet submarine that sank in the
Pacific. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The CIA's right to
neither confirm nor deny the existence of CIA-held information was reinforced by the
sweeping authority granted to the CIA director in CIA v. Sims. See Sims, 471 U.S. at 181.
300. See The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1.
301. See Senate and House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1.
302. The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 128-30 & 484 n.112; Senate and
House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at 9. See also Walter Pincus and Dan Eggen,
Agencies Faulted as Blind to al Qaeda, WASH. POST., April 15, 2004, at Al, A12. The Post
made this disclosure based on an 9/11 Commission interim report that was released several
months before its final report. Id.
303. The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 218-21; Senate and House Select
Comm. Report, supra note 1, at 13. See also David Johnston, Report of 9/11 Panel Cites
Lapses by CI.A. and FB.I., N.Y. TIMES, July 25,2003, at Al.
304. Senate and House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at 39. See also Susan
Schmidt and David Von Drehle, Hill's 9/11 Probe Finds Multiple Failures; Congressional
Inquiry Faults FBI Monitoring of Hijackers, WASH POST, Al, A15, July 25,2003.
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Besides what government investigators learned, news media
reports also have provided information about CIA lapses. For
example, The New York Times reported that the Agency failed to
pursue a crucial lead provided by German intelligence officials two-
and-a-half years before the 9/11 attacks. German agents gave the CIA
the first name and the Hamburg, Germany, telephone number for
terrorist Marwan al-Shehhi in March 1999. On September 11, 2001,
al-Shehhi took the controls of United Airlines Flight 175 and flew it
into the South Tower of the World Trade Center.
In addition to the litany of CIA failures and misjudgments in
connection with the 9/11 attacks, the Senate Intelligence Committee
has harshly criticized the CIA for grave miscalculations in its role in
the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.3°6 In a scathing and unanimous report
released in July 2004, the committee found that CIA assessments of
Iraqi weapons strength-particularly concerning chemical and
biological weapons of mass destruction, and future nuclear
capability-were overstated or unfounded. 3°7 The 511-page report
described the Agency as a broken and dysfunctional corporate
culture suffering from poor management,"' and concluded: "In the
end, what the President and the Congress used to send the country to
war was information provided by the intelligence community, and
that information was flawed." '
Such alarming CIA failures are not limited only to the recent
events of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Indeed, the specious "great
deference" theory has survived despite a long history of CIA troubles
and embarrassments going back decades. Historian Jeffrey A. Smith
observed that the lack of public accountability has "allowed
numerous follies" by the Agency since the 1960s. Writing about the
305. See James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, C.I.A. Was Given Data on Hijacker Long
Before 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,2004, at Al, A17.
306. See Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq, Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., 2d Sess.,
July 7, 2004 [hereinafter The Prewar Intelligence Report]. See also Douglas Jehl, Senators
Assail C.IA. Judgments on Iraq's Arms as Deeply Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2004, at
Al; Dana Priest, Report Says CIA Distorted Iraq Data, WASH. POST, July 12, 2004, at Al.
307. See The Prewar Intelligence Report, supra note 306.
308. See id.
309. See id. Several months before the Senate Intelligence Committee's report was
released, Bob Woodward disclosed that, in the weeks before the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
former CIA Director Tenet personally assured President George W. Bush that it was a
"slam-dunk case" to prove to the American people that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction. See Bob Woodward, With CIA Push, Movement to War Accelerated, WASH.
POST., April 19, 2002, at Al, All.
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Kennedy administration's "misadventures in covert actions," Smith
said that "[p]erhaps the most irrational and inept ones were the
dozens of CIA schemes to topple the Soviet-backed regime in Cuba,
schemes that included paramilitary raids, counterfeiting,
contamination of sugar crops, and a series of plots to kill Castro with
the help of organized crime figures."3
In the introduction to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan's book,
Secrecy, Richard Gid Powers noted that the CIA failed to foresee the
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 32 and grossly miscalculated the
size of the Soviet and East German economies in the years
immediately before the collapse of the Soviet Union.3 3 In fact,
Moynihan pointed out that CIA estimates of Soviet productivity and
military intentions during the Cold War "had failed from the
beginning," as early as 1948.314 Moynihan also noted that during the
Gerald Ford Administration, CIA assessments of Soviet economic
and military capabilities "were wrong by 180 degrees." ' In the years
following the end of the Cold War, the Agency had been involved in a
series of embarrassing incidents that have further contributed to an
Agency record of imprudent actions and outright misdeeds such as
engaging in corporate espionage abroad,3 6 providing U.S. Presidents
with information supplied by double agents,3 7 and failing to identify
PREROGATIVE POWER 225 (Oxford University Press 1999).
311. Id. at 180.
312. RICHARD GID POWERS, in DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 13-14 (Yale University Press 1998).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 197-98.
315. Id. at 198-99.
316. In 1995, four CIA officers were accused by France of conducting an economic
espionage operation against the French government. The CIA was, in effect, spying for
Hollywood. The United States was unhappy with French demands to restrict imports of
U.S. television programming into Europe, and part of the CIA operation was to determine
the strength of the French bargaining position in television and telecommunications trade
negotiations. The bungled operation forced the CIA to suspend virtually all of its
operations in France in 1995, thus undermining the CIA's ability to collect information in
France on terrorism and arms smuggling. Downplayed by CIA, Paris Incident Has Wide
Impact, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at Al.
317. CIA Linked to at Least 35 Suspect Reports, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at A21. It
was learned that between 1986 and 1994, CIA officers passed on at least 35 reports to top
U.S. policy-makers without disclosing that the information came from suspected Soviet
double agents. Id. Of these, there were at least 11 instances in which the CIA gave
Presidents reports from operatives known by the CIA to be double agents, said Sen. Arlen
Specter, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 3 Ex-CIA Directors
Blamed for Agency Role in Misdeeds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at Al. CIA Inspector
General Frederick Hitz recommended in 1995 that three former CIA directors be held
accountable for disinformation that was passed to the President from Soviet double
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traitors operating in its own midst."' So turbulent were those years
that the appointment of Tenet as acting CIA director in 1996 gave the
Agency its fifth director since 1991."19 During testimony before the
9/11 Commission, Tenet characterized the Agency he inherited in
1996 as "a program in disarray."3z° Despite his efforts to improve
operations, the CIA was caught by surprise in 1998 when it failed to
anticipate a nuclear test by India.3 21
Journalist David Brooks, former Op-ed Editor of the Wall Street
Journal and former Senior Editor of Weekly Standard magazine, put
it bluntly:
For decades, the U.S. intelligence community has propagated the
myth that it possesses analytical methods that must be insulated
pristinely from the hurly-burly world of politics. The CIA has
portrayed itself as, and been treated as, a sort of National Weather
Service of global affairs. It has relied on this aura of scientific
objectivity for its prestige, and to justify its large budgets, despite a
record studded with error.
The CIA's troubled history, underscored by the missteps
surrounding the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington,
D.C., and the miscalculations before the 2003 invasion of Iraq,
agents. Hitz blamed former directors R. James Woolsey, Robert M. Gates and William H.
Webster for the CIA's failure to inform the White House that the CIA had known that
much of the top-secret intelligence information acquired by the United States was
obtained from Soviet double agents. Id
318. In 1994, CIA agent Aldrich H. Ames, a former chief of the Soviet
counterintelligence branch, had been selling CIA secrets to Moscow for nearly a decade.
He betrayed three dozen Soviets who worked for the CIA, ten of whom were executed.
The Capture of a Deadly Mole, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1994, at 24. Other CIA
counterintelligence failures include the defection to Moscow of former CIA agent Edward
Lee Howard in September 1985; the 1987 discovery that almost all the 40 or so agents
among Fidel Castro's military and intelligence services recruited by the CIA were really
double agents; and the 1989 finding that the handful of East German agents recruited by
the CIA were actually double agents. See CIA Struggles to Find Identity in a New World;
Ames Scandal Highlights Many Agency Problems, WASH. POST, May 9, 1994, at Al. Two
years later, CIA officer Harold J. Nicholson, the former Romanian station chief, was
charged with espionage and conspiracy for betraying American spies and passing a wide
range of top-secret information to Moscow. Career CIA Officer Is Charged With Spying
for Russia, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1996, at Al.
319. In the decade before Tenet took office, William H. Webster was the Director of
Central Intelligence, from 1987-1991; Robert M. Gates, from 1991-1993; R. James
Woolsey, from 1993-1995; and John M. Deutch, from 1995-1996. Tenet succeeded
Woolsey as acting DCI and officially took office July 11, 1997. Tenet, who stepped down
on July 11, 2004, the seventh anniversary of his tenure, is the second longest-serving
director in the CIA's history. Allen Dulles served as director from 1953 to 1961.
320. Douglas Jehl, Caution and Years of Budget Cuts Are Seen to Limit CI.A., N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2004,at Al.
321. Id.
322. David Brooks, The CIA: Method and Madness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,2002, at A23.
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seriously challenges the worn-out core notion that secrecy in matters
of intelligence and national security automatically outweighs the
public benefits of disclosure. The kind of blanket secrecy the
Supreme Court endorsed in CIA v. Sims does not fit in the political
and social cultures of today's America. The Court majority's rationale
was a product of the Cold War era's tolerance of unchecked
government secrecy in matters even marginally related to national
security. Paternalistic government and blind public acceptance of
policy when it comes to this nation's defense and foreign relations-
the core interests at stake in CIA intelligence gathering-represent
the thinking of a culture that no longer exists.
In fact, the beginnings of this shift in culture were recognized
more than a generation ago. During Senate debates on the 1974
FOIA amendment to revise the national security exemption, Sen.
Jacob Javits said the American public had come to expect more
government openness and accountability:
[T]he whole movement of government, especially in view of
Government's experience in Vietnam, Watergate, and many other
directions ... should be toward more openness rather than being
toward more closed.... [W]e have finally come abreast of the fact
of life that it is not providence on Mount Sinai that stamps a
document secret or top secret.323
What is needed in the post-9/11 era, as The 9/11 Commission
pointed out, is a new model for how the CIA gathers, evaluates and
makes accessible intelligence information of public importance. The
9/11 Commission Report is replete with references to the "new
challenges"3 24 that the United States faces in the twenty-first century
in terms of its military,3E2 world politics,326 models of governmental
managementV2 and, of course, national security.3 8 Truly, as the 9/11
Commission noted: "[T]he national security institutions of the U.S.
government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War.
The United States confronts a very different world today."329
323. House and Senate Debate on Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1974,
Senate Debate and Vote, May 30, 1974 (Statement by Sen. Jacob Javits), reprinted in
Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), Joint Comm. of the
Comm. of Government Operations of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comm.
on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate [hereinafter THE 1974 FOIA SOURCE BOOK], 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., March 1975, at 311.
324. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 353.
325. Id. at 208.
326. Id. at 362.
327. Id. at 406.
328. Id. at 399.
329. Id.
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Likewise, it is also time for a new public-information access
model for the twenty-first century-a more mature model of
democratic transparency that takes into account the powerful and
profound societal and political changes the United States has
undergone since Richard Nixon resigned, since Saigon fell and since
the Soviet Union collapsed. This new model must reflect the
fundamental democratic principle of public accountability-the
overarching theory behind the FOIA. The 9/11 Commission Report
emphasized the important role that public oversight plays in
connection with effective congressional oversight to hold the CIA and
the intelligence community at large accountable:
[T]he Intelligence committees cannot take advantage of
democracy's best oversight mechanism: public disclosure. This
makes them significantly different from other congressional
oversight committees, which are often spurred into action by the
work of investigative journalists and watchdog organizations.
One of the big dangers posed by the Supreme Court's
imprimatur of the "great deference" rationale in CIA v. Sims331 is that
the CIA can evade the prod of public accountability and exploit
secrecy to conceal its failures and blunders. As First Amendment
scholar and Harvard law professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr. noted in
1947, the same year, incidentally, that Congress enacted the National
Security Act:
No doubt there are many matters which ought not to be disclosed
for a time, but the officials should not have a free hand to
determine what those matters are or to lock them up forever. It
may be human nature for them to want their mere say-so to be
decisive on the need for secrecy, but the possession of such a power
would allow them to hoist public safety as an umbrella to cover
their own mistakes.
332
Excessive secrecy that cannot be pierced by the public can not
only hide embarrassing CIA failures and mismanagement, but also
threatens Agency effectiveness and good management. James Russell
Wiggins, a former Washington Post managing editor who was at the
forefront of newspaper industry support for the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966, observed that government secrecy relieves
officials "of the prod of public knowledge, the spur of public criticism
and the aid of public suggestion.03
330. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 103.
331. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178-81 (1985).
332. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., 1 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 14
(1947).
333. WIGGINS, supra note 48, at 113.
At the very least, a legislative remedy is urgently needed to
replace the broad definition of "intelligence sources" in Sims because
its impact holds far-reaching implications for public access in the
political climate of the post 9/11 era. For example, a section of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which lays out guidelines for "Access
to Information," plainly states: "[A]ny information under this act is
shared, retained, and disseminated consistent with the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods under the National Security Act of 1947."334 What this
language strongly suggests is that records compiled under the
authority of the Homeland Security Act can be deemed exempt from
the FOIA if the Director of Central Intelligence merely asserts that
the information could reveal "intelligence sources" as defined by the
Court in CIA v. Sims.
335
C. A Model for CIA Disclosure Requirements Under the Freedom of
Information Act
Congress needs to redefine "intelligence sources" in a way that
protects legitimate sources of intelligence information, but also
recognizes that not every source of information is an intelligence
source. An appropriate definition should provide a non-discretionary
test to clarify whether a source of information is, first, an "intelligence
source," and, second, deserving of confidentiality. For such a
definition, the test crafted by Justices Marshall and Brennan in their
Sims concurrence still holds merit today. Under their standard,
confidentiality would extend to "intelligence sources" who provide
information on either an explicit or implicit promise of
confidentiality. Further, confidentiality also would apply to
information that could be expected to lead to the identification of an
intelligence source.336
Such a revised definition for "intelligence sources" could prove
to be a significant step toward achieving CIA accountability under the
FOIA. However, a more substantive and lasting solution would be for
Congress to nullify the Sims Court's decision altogether. In fact, Chief
Justice Burger wrote in Sims that "Congress certainly is capable of
334. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2147,
§201(d)(12)(B)(emphasis added). President Bush signed the legislation into law on Nov.
25, 2002, after Congress reconvened for an extraordinary "lame duck" session to enact the
law on an accelerated schedule.
335. Sims, 471 U.S. at 168-73.
336. Id. at 193-94 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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drafting legislation that narrows the category of protected sources of
information. '
Congress has taken such measures in the past. This article has
reviewed the two congressional precedents for overriding previous
Supreme Court FOIA decisions: Exemption 1 was revised in 1974 to
nullify EPA v. Mink,'38 and Exemption 3 was revised in 1976 to nullify
Administrator, FAA v. Robertson.339 These revisions were prompted
by Congress' intent to maintain a check on executive branch
authority340 and to limit agency discretion.341
A key congressional committee already is on record for refusing
to endorse CIA v. Sims.342 However, Congress failed to follow through
and officially repudiate the Court's decision.343 In 1992, lawmakers
challenged the Sims ruling when the House of Representatives
reauthorized the National Security Act.344 The conference committee
report on the Intelligence Authorization bill stated: "Whether there is
justification to permit the DCI to withhold information concerning
intelligence sources and methods which [are] not classified in
response to [FOIA] requests.., is a matter which deserves closer,
more systematic review." '  Although legislators reauthorized the
National Security Act provision that states the Director of Central
Intelligence has "the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, '"346 the conferees emphasized
that they "do not intend their [reauthorization] action to constitute an
endorsement of the holding in Sims. "347
Congressional failure to follow through on the 1992 conference
committee's report on CIA v Sims is yet another example of what The
9/11 Commission characterized as Congress' much larger failure to
exercise the imagination needed to challenge outmoded intelligence
traditions and muster the political will necessary to hold the CIA
accountable for its actions and performance. 348 In effect, congressional
337. Id. at 169 n.13.
33& EPA v. Mink, 401 U.S. 73 (1972).
339. FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 55 (1974).
340. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 12 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6290.
341. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, at 23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204-05.
342. Sims, 471 U.S. 159.
343. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 102-963, at 88 (1992), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2614.
344. Id
345. Id.
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legislators have virtually abrogated their CIA oversight
responsibilities. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that
Congress shares equally in the blame for the 2001 terrorist attacks.
The 9/11 Commission Report put it bluntly: "Congressional oversight
for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is now dysfunctional. 'M9
This article, therefore, proposes a two-prong model for a
legislative remedy that would take an important first step toward CIA
oversight and accountability. Under this model, Congress would
nullify CIA v. Sims by (1) clarifying that the CIA is subject to
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and (2) appointing
a special court that would deal exclusively with all access requests
rejected on grounds of national security.
1. Congress needs to establish that CIA withholding decisions are subject to
the FOIA, including key Exemption 1 provisions permitting de novo
judicial review and requiring the segregation and release of unclassified
material.
This proposed change is a modest one. The nine exemptions to
the FOIA already provide a wide variety of legitimate exceptions to
disclosure that do not conflict with congressional guidelines intended
to limit CIA discretion in FOIA withholding decisions.3 ° Exemptions
6 and 7 alone, the privacy and law enforcement exemptions, could
easily be used to protect unclassified sensitive CIA information,35' and
Exemption 1, the national security exemption, protects classified
information.352
This measure would enhance CIA accountability and
government transparency by eliminating Agency evasion of two
congressional requirements that check CIA authority: de novo review
and the segregation rule. As previously discussed, de novo judicial
review enables a court to confirm that assertedly classified
information actually falls within the category of information
protected under Executive Order.353 Under this requirement the CIA
349. The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 420.
350. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)-(9) (2000). The FOIA does not apply to matters that fall
under the categories of (1) classified information and national security; (2) internal agency
personnel information; (3) information exempted by statutes; (4) trade secrets and other
confidential business information; (5) agency memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade
personal privacy; (7) law enforcement investigation records; (8) reports from regulated
financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information.
351. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7) (2000).
352. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
353. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
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would be subject to de novo review whenever a FOIA requester
appeals a withholding decision.M
The rationale behind de novo judicial review in national security
matters was clearly and forcefully expressed by Rep. John Moss,
widely recognized as the driving force behind the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966 and a principal crafter of the statute's 1974
amendments.355 He argued that judges have the capacity to review
even sensitive matters of national security. 6 "I do not think we have
to make dummies out of [judges] by insisting they accept without
question an affidavit from some bureaucrat-anxious to protect his
decisions whether they be good or bad-that a particular document
was properly classified and should remain secret," Moss declared
during the House debate on the 1974 FOIA amendments. "No
bureaucrat is going to admit he might have made a mistake." '357 Moss
said it was the full intent of Congress in 1966, and again in 1974, to
make it "crystal clear" that the courts must be "free to employ
whatever means they find necessary to discharge their
responsibilities" through comprehensive de novo review in
Exemption 1 national security matters.358
When Congress amended the FOIA in 1974 to permit de novo
review in Exemption 1 cases, Congress also required the segregation
and disclosure of unclassified information contained in a classified
record.39 CIA end-runs around both the de novo review and
segregation requirements have been possible as a direct result of CIA
v. Sims.36° The CIA's currently uncurbed discretion for disclosure
under the National Security Act is a congressionally unauthorized
power that directly conflicts with Congress' intent as expressed in the
1976 FOIA amendment to Exemption 3, which specifically limits
354. Id.
355. See HaIstuk, supra note 53, at 116. From 1955 until the FOIA was enacted in
1966, Moss chaired two committees that were at the center of reform efforts to enact a
federal open-records law. See also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
356. See House and Senate Debate on Freedom of Information Act Amendments of
1974, House Debate and Vote, March 14, 1974 (Statement by Rep. John Moss), reprinted
in THE 1974 FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 323, at 257.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 258.
359. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). See also FOIA GUIDE supra note 39, at 122-23.
The 1974 segregation-and-disclosure rule also applies to records withheld under
Exemption 1. See Oglesby v. United States Dep't of the Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); Krikorian v. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
360. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159,189-90 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
agency discretion in withholding decisions.36' The FOIA states that
under Exemption 3, a record can be withheld under another statute
"provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld
from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue,
or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld." 2
This first prong thus represents a step toward reform by
establishing limits on CIA discretion and requiring a level of judicial
oversight that has been abandoned in favor of the flawed "great
deference" rationale. It would mandate an interpretation of the
National Security Act that strictly comports with the plain meaning
and legislative intent of the FOIA and its nine statutory exemptions.
2. Congress needs to appoint a special court that would deal exclusively with
access disputes concerning national security.
After Congress institutes de novo judicial review for FOIA
national security disputes involving the CIA, lawmakers next must
create a special court of judges with the expertise and qualifications
needed to deal specifically with the complex issues that arise when
there is a clash between the competing and legitimate values of
government transparency and government secrecy. The need for
consistent, effective and specialized judicial review of the
unprecedented national security issues now facing America has
become necessary because these problems are not temporary. Almost
daily, global events make it abundantly clear that terrorism-related
national defense issues will merit special attention for many years to
come, possibly decades.
Appointing a panel of federal judges with the bona fides to hear
such cases would rebut one of the principal objections to de novo
review voiced by Chief Justice Burger in CIA v. Sims: Judges have
"little or no background in the delicate business of intelligence
gathering." 36 It is crucial to empanel a qualified special court in order
for the judiciary to exercise true de novo review; federal district court
and appellate court judges seldom challenge a national security claim
presented by the government because they simply do not want to be
blamed for a disclosure decision that could later be asserted to have
damaged the nation's defense or foreign relations. 36 The record
361. See id.
362. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
363. Sims, 471 U.S. at 176.
364. See O'REILLY, supra note 53, at 502. For a comprehensive examination of the
failure of judges to exercise true de novo review in national security cases, see Robert P.
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shows that the courts have upheld virtually every Exemption 1
withholding decision to date, mainly because of the great deference
judges pay to national security claims by the government. 365
There is a long history, stretching from 1855 to the 1980s, of
Congress appointing special Article III federal courts to address new
or emerging issues that require expertise.6 In addition, this court
could be statutorily empowered to appoint qualified special masters
with proper security clearance and expertise to assist judges and make
recommendations when large volumes of material need to be
examined in camera.67
Finally, Congress needs to emphasize that a true balancing test
should be the device used by the special court in determining whether
a requested record should be disclosed. This balancing analysis,
clearly prescribed by Congress in the FOIA's legislative history,6
would weigh the democratic benefits of disclosure and an informed
public against the CIA's practical needs for secrecy and an effective
intelligence service. In other words, a true balancing would recognize
that some information always can be potentially useful to an enemy,
but this same information can be of much greater use to the public.
Keeping this kind of information secret can hurt the nation more than
help an enemy. As noted earlier, for example, congressional
investigators found that for years before 9/11, the CIA had more than
sufficient information about the imminent menace posed by al Qaeda
to prompt defensive measures, such as strengthening aviation security
and alerting the American public to the seriousness and immediacy of
the potential threat.3 69 It is highly unlikely that any of this information
Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation Over National Security
Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REv. 67 (1992).
365. See O'REILLY, supra note 53, at 502.
366. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III provides that: "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. See also CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 15-21 (5th ed. 1994). For example, Congress created
the Court of Claims in 1855; the Commerce Court in 1910; the Customs Court in 1926; and
the Emergency Court of Appeals during the Second World War. Congress has also
created several courts under Article I: the U.S. Tax Court (1969), the U.S. Court of
Veterans Appeals (1988), and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (restructured in 1984). See id.
367. One commentator has suggested using special masters to assist judges in district
and appellate courts in FOIA national security litigation. See Deyling, supra note 364, at
105. That remedy by itself, however, is insufficient because, ultimately, only a federaljudge has the authority to decide a FOIA exemption dispute.
368. S. REp. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965). See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 189 n.5 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
369. Senate and House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1, at xv & 118. See also supra
notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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would have been available under the strict secrecy protections in CIA
v. Sims.
VI. Conclusion
When the Supreme Court exempted the CIA from the Freedom
of Information Act in CIA v. Sims,37° the majority engaged in
historical revisionism, selectively interpreting the pertinent legislative
histories and replacing Congress' FOIA policy judgments with Court-
crafted policy.37" ' Recent and dramatic revelations about CIA missteps
in connection with the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq
tragically illustrate the dangers of freeing the CIA from public
scrutiny and evaluation.
The model proposed in this article offers a foundation for
desperately needed reform by holding the CIA accountable to the
public. This author understands that even if Congress were to adopt
this model or a similar remedy, there still would be significant
obstacles to access. Classification criteria are determined by the
President, and these standards vary from administration to
administration." Further, the executive branch agencies historically
have overused the "classified" stamp,3 creating mountains of secret
documents,374 and national security under Exemption 1 traditionally
370. 471 U.S. 159.
371. See id at 193 (Marshall, J., concurring).
372. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Exec. Order. No. 13,292, 68
Fed. Reg. 15,315 (2003). Protection of "intelligence activities" and "intelligence sources
and methods" are detailed under Sec. 1.4(c); Sec. 3.4(c); Sec. 3.5 (e); and Sec. 4.3(a).
373. In one of the clearest and most forceful expressions of the dangers of
overclassification, Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart wrote in the 1971 Pentagon
Papers case that "when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by
those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the
hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible
disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly
maintained." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
374. For example, Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate Intelligence
Committee harshly criticized the CIA for overclassification when the committee
investigated CIA intelligence operations in the United States invasion of Iraq. In June
2004, the CIA ruled that nearly 40 percent of a 400-page report prepared by committee
contained classified materials, and the Agency deleted the information. The committee's
report focused on mistakes and miscalculations in prewar intelligence about Iraq and its
weapons programs. Douglas Jehl, C.I.A. Classifies Much of a Report on Its Failings, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A9. After the CIA deleted the information, Sen. Pat Roberts, the
Kansas Republican who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, said, "I think the great
majority of this report should be made public. Our report is a good one ... and the
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has been defined broadly by both Congress and the courts.375
However, the overclassification problem is a separate issue, and it
needs to be fought on another legislative front. Lastly, it can be
argued that the FBI is subject to the FOIA, and it too was excoriated
by both the congressional joint panel, and the 9/11 Commission.376
Nonetheless, decisive action to make the CIA subject to the
FOIA represents a significant move toward accountability because it
would eliminate the Court-sanctioned policy of carte-blanche secrecy
now in place.3'7 The model proposed here would provide for judicial
oversight on a case-by-case basis; enhance the separation of powers
doctrine by re-instituting the FOIA checks on agency discretion that
Congress mandated, particularly in the 1974 and 1976 amendments;
and place the burden of defending a withholding decision on the CIA,
thus putting the Agency into compliance with the FOIA as Congress
intended.378 Moreover, such a legislative remedy would return policy-making decisions to the political branches of government where
American People certainly deserve to see it." Id According to West Virginia Sen. John D.
Rockefeller, the ranking Democrat on the committee, the CIA had "overclassified much
of the report to the extent that it will prevent the American public from knowing the truth
about how the intelligence community performed leading up to the war." Id. See also THE
1974 FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 323, at 257 for a historical view of
overclassification. ("Unfortunately, the system of classification which has evolved in the
United States has failed to meet the standards for an open and democratic society,
allowing too many papers to be classified for too long a time." Statement by Rep. John
Moss at a March 14, 1974 House debate on the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, quoting
President Richard M. Nixon). See also JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE 17
(Little, Brown and Co. 2004).
375. See, e.g., Bowers v. Dep't of Justice, 930 F.2d 350, 357 (4th Cir. 1991) ("What fact
or bit of information may compromise national security is best left to the intelligence
experts."); Taylor v. Dep't of the Army, 221 U.S. App. D.C. 325, 684 F. 2d 99, 109 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (the Agency's determination should be accorded "utmost deference.");
Washington Post v. Dep't of Defense, 766 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1991) (Judicial review of
Agency classification decisions should be "quite deferential."); Salisbury v. United States,
223 U.S. App. D.C. 243, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Agency discretion merits great
deference because "executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign
policy matters have unique insights into what adverse [effects] might occur as a result of
public disclosure of a particular classified record."); Halperin v. CIA, 203 App. D.C. 110,
629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Summary judgment should be granted in favor of the
government in a FOIA Exemption 1 national security action on the basis of agency
affidavits as long as they simply contain "reasonable specificity" and they are not called
into question by contradictory evidence or by evidence of agency bad faith.)
376. See generally, The 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, and Senate and
House Select Comm. Report, supra note 1. See Philip Shenon and Eric Lichtblau, FB.I. Is
Assailed For Its Handling of Terror Risks, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2004, at Al, A15; David
Johnston, Report of 9/11 Panel Cites Lapses by CLA. and FB.L, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2003, at A-1.
377. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
378. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). See also Sims, 471 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., concurring).
HOLDING THE SPYMASTERS ACCOUNTABLE AFTER 9/11
public opinion can matter. American society has undergone a
profound shift in culture since Vietnam, Watergate and the end of the
Cold War in terms of what the public has come to expect to know
about governance and to demand in transparency.379 Public opinion
might not matter to the appointed federal judiciary, but it can
influence decision-making by the legislative and the executive
branches. According to the findings by the 9/11 Commission and the
joint Senate and House joint panel, and the subsequent public
reaction to these reports, Congress already may be getting that
message.
The debate surrounding these investigations is far from over. For
example, immediately after the Senate and House joint panel
released its findings, some U.S. counterterrorism officials argued that
the report was misleading? ° They contended that the report
combined disparate facts whose relevance in advance of the attacks
was extremely difficult to grasp. "As the information was gathered
over time-like a collection of puzzle pieces-by a number of
agencies... no one person or agency had the complete picture of
Sept. 11 we have now," a senior law enforcement official said. 38'
That is precisely the point-contrary to former Chief Justice
Burger's assertion that the Director of Central Intelligence should be
granted unreviewable discretion to withhold information under the
FOIA because he is the only person familiar with the whole picture
and able to make sense of each piece of intelligence information.
3 2
Keeping the lid on information that should be part of the public
discourse on issues of national concern conflicts with the democratic
principles of transparent government and the First Amendment rights
of citizens to debate vital policy questions. When the CIA shrouds
itself in secrecy, limiting the information available to the public, it
restricts the infusion of new ideas, innovative thinking and potential
solutions to perhaps the most serious and unprecedented problems
facing America today.
379. As William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence from 1973 to 1976, wrote only
a few years after Watergate and Vietnam: "[I]ntelligence judgments must be supplied
impartially to all factions, to help the best solution to emerge, rather than the favored one.
[The information] will then be debated and the sage unanimity of the cloistered world of
intelligence will be challenged." WILLIAM COLBY & PETER FORBATH, HONORABLE
MEN: MY LIFE IN THE CIA 465-66 (Simon & Schuster 1978).
380. David Johnston, Report of 9/11 Panel Cites Lapses by C.LA. and FB.L, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2003, at Al.
381. Id.
382 Sims, 471 U.S. at 178.
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